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Abstract 
 
The GCC Pivot to Asia:  
The Security of US Interests in the Arabian Gulf 
 
Sarah Elizabeth Kaiser-Cross, M.A./M.G.P.S. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor: Jeremi Suri  
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council’s pivot to Asia began as a slow process of economic 
integration in the early 2000s but significantly accelerated after the US Shale Revolution, 
beginning in 2008. As US production increased and imports from foreign oil suppliers 
declined, many expected the relationships between the US and its GCC partners to 
similarly decline. The emerging markets of Asia and rising demand from China captured 
GCC interest. The GCC nations took steps to diversify their markets away from the US. 
Economic cooperation morphed into budding diplomatic and strategic relationships 
between the GCC and China. Meanwhile, the US, no longer as reliant on GCC energy, 
restructured its foreign policy toward the GCC around defense cooperation and human 
rights. Though US-GCC relationships remained relatively strong, the uprisings of the 
Arab Spring resulted in mounting US criticism of GCC human rights violations, 
weakening US leverage in the region. The Chinese took advantage of US-GCC tension, 
offering an alternative model of diplomatic engagement— ignoring human rights. Arab 
populations saw the economic rise of China as an alternative diplomatic model, one that 
prioritized economic development without attaching political strings to bilateral 
relationships. Some GCC nations also viewed Chinese influence as a potential foil to US 
influence in the region. Despite budding local support for stronger ties with China, the 
 vii 
 
Chinese are not able to displace US influence in the Gulf yet because China is unable to 
provide the quality or quantity of defense sales and cooperation the US provides. In the 
long-term, though, Chinese policies will likely present a challenge to US influence in the 
Gulf. The US should reexamine its policies on human rights promotion and reevaluate its 
strategic interests to protect the short and long term interests of the US in a region of 
great geostrategic importance. 
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 1 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 At an Australian press conference in the fall of 2012, President Obama officially 
announced the US pivot to Asia, declaring, “the United States is a Pacific power, and we 
are here to stay.”1 President Obama’s speech signaled a shift in US attention and 
resources to the nations of Asia by extensively expanding diplomatic, security, and 
economic ties in the Pacific region.  As the world anticipated that US policies and 
attention would shift eastward, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 2 
became concerned that the US, their primary ally and security guarantor would become 
absorbed in the East. The nations of the GCC searched for new partners, initiating a 
similar pivot toward the East to secure their place in the global economy by “reorienting 
its oil and natural gas exports away from Western markets towards emerging markets in 
Asia.”3 The GCC pivot toward the East, however, began as a process of economic 
integration between the GCC and China in the early 2000s that significantly accelerated 
after US shale producers exponentially increased their production of oil and gas after the 
Shale Revolution.  
                                                
1  "Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament." The White House. The White House, 17 
Nov. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.  
2 While the GCC is a regional union of Gulf States designed to integrate the political and economic 
elements of Gulf nations, it is also a term used to generally refer to the Gulf nations. For purposes of 
clarity, the author refers to the GCC and the Gulf interchangeably. Yemen is not included in this paper, as it 
is not a member of the GCC nor is its political status reflective of the political or economic situation of the 
other Gulf nations. Thus, references to the Gulf exclude Yemen.  
3 Thottathil, Mahsoom. "Middle East Pivot to Asia for Big Trade & Energy Growth." Arabian Gazette, 11 
Nov. 2013. Web. 7 Dec. 2014. 
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Though the reaction of the GCC countries never made headlines in English 
language media, their focus eastward began to affect the US-GCC political dynamics. 
The GCC countries began developing stronger political relationships, initiating strategic 
partnerships, and cementing robust trade relations with China. In diplomatic interactions, 
China highlighted its dedication to the principle of non-interference in other countries 
internal affairs to emphasize Chinese deference to its governmental partners, remaining 
particularly silent on issues of human rights.4 The US on the other hand defined its 
foreign policy, in part, by advocating transparency and democracy with most of its 
partners,5 seen by some as interfering in other countries’ domestic affairs.6 For instance, 
during and after the Arab Spring in 2011, the US censured human rights violations and 
even froze military sales to Bahrain in order to encourage the government to halt human 
rights abuses. It remained nearly silent on Saudi human rights violations during the same 
period. Meanwhile, China-GCC partnerships expanded vis-à-vis Chinese investments in 
Gulf economies and increasingly frequent diplomatic visits. China did not tie its bilateral 
relationships to human rights. Instead, China pursued a policy of economic engagement 
with GCC nations, confident that diplomatic and strategic relationships would develop in 
parallel.  
From an economic perspective, demonstrative of shifting global markets, a 2013 
report by the Asia Investment Institute found that,  
                                                
4 "China's Foreign Minister Stresses Principle of Non-interference at UN Debate." UN News Center. UN, 
27 Sept. 2012. Web. 7 Dec. 2014.  
5 "Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor." US Department of State. US Department of State. 
Web. 7 Nov. 2014.  
6 US policy is both selective and inconsistent in this regard.  
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“Asian countries with emerging economies currently import forty-three per cent 
of the total energy exported from the Gulf states, up from a mere fifteen per cent 
in 1990. Within the same context, with regard to the major economic blocs in the 
world (Japan, Europe, and US), indicators for 1990 show that they have imported 
about forty-five per cent of the total exports of the GCC. However, the shares of 
these blocs combined have dropped to twenty-three per cent only after more than 
two decades.”7  
In other words, GCC exports to the US and Europe halved while GCC trade to Asia 
doubled, strengthening economic ties primarily with China. During this period, GCC 
energy imports to the US continued to decline.  
This paper assesses how the GCC’s pivot to Asia, specifically China, impacts US 
economic, strategic, and diplomatic relationships with key GCC nations. Do stronger 
economic ties with China replace or weaken US influence in the Gulf? To answer this 
question, this paper explores shifting relationships between the US, Saudi Arabia, and 
Bahrain compared to parallel changes between China, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. By 
evaluating these relationships, policymakers can recognize the shifting political landscape 
and the potential threat posed by China in the Gulf to best protect US interests in the 
short and long term.  
I conclude that in the short term, China poses little threat to the United States in 
the Arabian Peninsula. Chinese action in the Gulf may even relieve some pressure on the 
                                                
7 Abdullah, Dr. Jamal. "The Shale Gas Revolution and Its Impact on the GCC Economy." Al Jazeera, 13 
Nov. 2013. Web. 12 Apr. 2015.  
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US by providing resources to secure the commons and encourage stability through 
investments and economic development. For the next decade or two, the United States 
will likely continue its role as protector for the GCC nations, based on a mutually 
beneficial defense relationship and Saudi and Bahraini reliance on US military systems. 
US human rights policies, though, are counterproductive in the short run, complicating 
US relationships and reducing US leverage during periods of instability and tension. 
GCC populations are frustrated with what they view as US interference in domestic 
affairs. Calls for strengthened ties with China paired with frustration at US polices are 
provoking appeals for greater Chinese influence in the Gulf. China is taking advantage of 
this uptick in popularity, capitalizing on unpopular US policies and presence in the 
region. China is offering GCC leaders an alternative diplomatic model through which 
they can engage, based on a transactional relationship.  
In the long run, however, China poses a challenge to US leadership in the region. 
The United States’ role as security guarantor in the Middle East is assured only while the 
US is the primary supplier of high quality weapons to the Gulf regimes. As China builds 
its defense industry and increases the quality and quantity of weapons sales to the 
monarchies, China will increase its influence on matters of security in the Gulf.  
The United States needs to reassess its strategy in the Arabian Peninsula for both 
the long and short term to regain favor among leaders and local populations, thus making 
it politically palatable for the Gulf monarchs to cooperate with the United States. 
Alleviating disdain for US policies will require a softer application of US strategies in the 
Gulf. A strategic reassessment of US foreign policy should consider alternative 
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approaches to maintaining, if not increasing US influence in the Gulf. Though the US 
may be less dependent on the Gulf for energy resources, the Gulf remains an area vital to 
the United States to maintain its military presence and influence in the broader Middle 
East.  
THE GCC PIVOT  
 
Six countries, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates, established the GCC in 1981 in an effort to respond to “the challenges of 
security and economic development” 8 during the Iran-Iraq War. Nearly 35 years later, 
the GCC has established itself as an important political and economic actor on the world 
stage, officially linking the economies and policies of some of the world’s most important 
energy producers and political actors. The US Department of State has praised the GCC’s 
growth as “a dynamic business hub, a critical shaper of media and culture in the Muslim 
world and a force in regional politics,”9 in addition to a critical US partner.  
Since the first Gulf War, the US and the GCC have worked closely on 
counterterrorism and joint-military training programs in the Arabian Gulf. This strategic 
relationship has remained relatively strong throughout the years though paradoxically, 
over the same period, US-GCC economic dependence on one another gradually lessened. 
Increasingly, US policies aimed to reach a point of energy independence, with the goal of 
                                                
8 Ahmadian, Alireza. "Is the GCC a Toothless Organization?" Foreign Policy Association, 12 May 2014. 
Web. 14 Apr. 2015.  
9 Burns, William. "A Renewed Agenda for U.S.-Gulf Partnership." U.S. Department of State. U.S. 
Department of State, 19 Feb. 2014. Web. 14 Apr. 2015.  
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eventually weaning itself off Gulf energy. This very public US ambition laid the 
foundation for Gulf unease. The GCC began to accelerate efforts to find new buyers for 
its energy resources and looked to Asia, where demand had skyrocketed. New economic 
relations began to necessitate new political partnerships with the gas-guzzling developing 
nations of Asia.  
While the Gulf began shifting its energy exports toward Asia, the GCC, along 
with the rest of the world, experienced the effects of the global economic crisis in 2008. 
The Gulf countries’ stock markets plummeted and  “oil prices dropped from $110 per 
barrel at the end of the third quarter to approximately $40 per barrel; and financing began 
to dry up.”10 The GCC countries assessed weaknesses and attempted to strengthen their 
financial sectors by encouraging investment and diversification of their economies from a 
variety of investors. Improvements were evident until 2011 when the political, military, 
and economic relationships began to show cracks. In early 2011, the uprisings known as 
the “Arab Spring” delivered another blow to the Gulf countries, frightening investors, and 
stalling domestic development in order to reestablish state security. In response to the 
repressive techniques used by nearly all of the Gulf regimes against their own people, the 
US placed a hold on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Bahrain and increased pressure on 
the Gulf governments to stop human rights violations and reform existing institutions.  
The widely broadcasted political pressure negatively affected the diplomatic 
relationships between the US and the Gulf countries. Local populations began to 
                                                
10 Shediac, Richard, Nabih Maroun, and Jihad Azour. "One Year After The GCC Region’s Post-Crisis 
Prospects." Booz&Co , 2009: 1-16. Web. 1 Mar. 2015.   
 7 
speculate about the necessity of US presence in the region. Though not the first time US 
policies were unpopular with an Arab audience, the Arab Spring marked the first time 
that both opposition parties (some of whom the US championed) and the ruling 
government denounced US interference and influence. Was US policy concerned with 
human rights or invested in protecting the regimes? For many regional leaders, the two 
were mutually exclusive. If the United States would not provide them with the weapons 
and the political support they needed to stay in power, they would turn elsewhere. The 
East, namely China, India, and Russia began to offer the military and security resources 
that the US refused to provide.  The dubious role of the Gulf security guarantor was open 
and China began to invest.  
In addition to building an economic foundation with the GCC, China invested 
significant resources into deepening cultural and diplomatic ties with the Gulf nations. 
Examples of such integration efforts include “Chinese officials…building mosques to 
attract more Arab traders,”11 and Chinese officials speaking “on Al Jazeera…in Arabic 
directly to the average Arab household.”12 The Chinese began extending their hand to the 
Arabs and the Arab populations began to take hold. Part of this paper explores the extent 
to which the Chinese government’s efforts are coming to fruition. 
  
                                                
11 Simpfendorfer, Ben. "Introduction." The New Silk Road: How a Rising Arab World Is Turning Away 
from the West and Rediscovering China. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 2-3. Print. 
12 Ibid. 4  
 8 
CASE SELECTION & METHODOLOGY  
I organized this paper into three parts. Part one encompasses the introduction, 
history of the GCC pivot, case selection, methodology, and a brief history of US and 
Chinese strategies in the GCC. Part two focuses on two case studies: Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain. Each case study analyzes three critical relationships: economic, diplomatic, and 
strategic. Each case reviews the shifting dynamics between the case country and the 
United States and the case country and China. The analysis focuses on the period 
beginning with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in January 2011 and ending in March 
2015. This period highlights the most recent major political shift in US diplomatic policy, 
which occurred during the Arab Spring. The revolutions of the Arab Spring were 
significant because they refocused attention on human rights issues in the Middle East 
after images from Cairo, Damascus, and Manama brought usually censored dissent to 
world headlines. The economic sections will cover a longer period to analyze broader 
economic trends, reaching back to the early 2000s to highlight significant shifts in US 
economic and trade policies.  
In order to present a holistic picture of the GCC pivot eastward and the resulting 
effects on US and Chinese relations in the GCC, I explore two different case studies; 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. I review the largest and smallest regional players in the GCC; 
two nations with varying political weights and energy revenues. Both nations have a 
history of close cooperation with the United States. Contrasting the Saudi and Bahraini 
approaches to China and the United States provides a useful binary approach through 
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which to observe the largest and smallest oil producers which both have strong 
diplomatic and strategic ties to the United States.  
The first case looks at Saudi Arabia, the largest GCC member and most powerful 
regional actor. Saudi Arabia is a politically anomalous actor in the region due to its 
historic, special relationship with the United States and its vast oil supplies. Saudi Arabia 
holds significant political sway and bargaining power with the United States due its 
position as the most important producer in OPEC, controlling a significant share of the 
oil and gas reserves and production in the world. The second case investigates the 
intricacies of Bahrain, a small island nation in the Gulf, which has had historically strong 
strategic and military ties with the United States. Bahrain holds considerably less political 
weight because it is not an OPEC member country and it does not produce large 
quantities of oil and gas. However, Bahrain’s geostrategic position in the Gulf cements its 
importance in Gulf affairs and US strategy, as it sits near the Strait of Hormuz and serves 
as a critical defensive position for observing Iran’s actions. Bahrain is a relatively liberal 
society compared to the highly conservative Saudi culture.  
To assess the strength of economic partnerships, I look at significant changes in 
the quantities of exports and imports, major investments in national companies and 
infrastructure projects, and changing trade volumes between GCC nations, the US, and 
China. As Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are dependent on energy sales for government 
revenue, each cases focuses on how trade patterns and energy products (LNG, oil, and 
petrochemicals) as well as non-energy commodities have shifted from the US and 
Western nations eastward. In addition, each case examines significant American and 
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Chinese investments in the Gulf nations and Gulf investments in the US and China. Have 
shifts in economic relationships impacted diplomatic relationships in a substantial way?  
  To illustrate the strength of bilateral diplomatic relationships, I analyze US and 
Chinese diplomatic engagement vis-à-vis human rights in the Gulf to understand their 
respective diplomatic approaches. The US Department of State (DoS) defines human 
rights loosely as “[principles] embodied in the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights.”13 The State Department explains that because “human rights are an important 
national interest,”14 the US has an obligation to “hold governments accountable…under 
universal human rights norms and international human rights instruments.”15 China, on 
the other hand, has no official stance on human rights. China firmly supports the principle 
of non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, effectively limiting its ability to 
comment on internal matters like human rights. China also has no desire for other nations 
to comment on its internal affairs.  
The US employs numerous vehicles to address international human rights 
violations including official reports, human rights rankings, and arms sale freezes. The 
different mechanisms attempt to foster open communication, offer suggestions for 
improvement, and at times, shame governments into compliance with human rights 
norms. The United States often utilizes international forums like the United Nations to 
speak to human rights violations around the globe and promote the observance of human 
rights principles. The US articulates varying degrees of condemnation for human rights 
                                                
13 "Human Rights Reports." US Department of State. US Department of State. Web. 8 Dec. 2014.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
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violations, depending on its diplomatic relationship with the violating country and the 
severity of the human rights issue.16  
In order to examine the role of human rights in foreign policy more closely, I 
explore the three most prominent ways through which the United States officially 
addresses the human rights violations of other nations. Part of US foreign policy 
encompasses promoting human rights, albeit selectively. Since 2011, assessments of 
violations have tended to fall into three categories: reactions to the Arab Spring, US 
Country Reports, and the promotion of individual human rights cases. To hold foreign 
governments accountable, the State Department releases annual country reports on 
human rights abuses in over 200 nations, including the countries of the GCC. The annual 
report entitled the “Country Report on Human Rights” assesses the most pressing human 
rights issues in each nation as a means of holding leaders accountable for violations of 
basic human rights. The language of the reports remains nearly identical every year, 
except where State Department officers add new evidence or remove comments that are 
no longer relevant. Political officers in the region contribute new information every year 
to the Country Reports for Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and send these updates to the 
Department of State, which then compiles the information. The State Department submits 
the full reports to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Affairs before releasing them to the public, in accordance with the Foreign 
                                                
16 This paper is unable to provide a full analysis of backchannel diplomatic engagement on human rights 
violations as the State Department protects available information by classification laws. Similarly, limited 
information was available from the intelligence community.  
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Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trade Act of 1974.17 Each case study also reviews 
speeches and statements in the United Nations, statements, and publications from the 
State Department or Foreign Ministry, as well as official articles published in the press. 
To review the impact of these policies from the perspective of Gulf citizens, I also 
evaluate public reactions to US and Chinese statements on human rights. Do Bahrainis or 
Saudis publicly promote stronger ties to the US or China because of attention or 
inattention to human rights?  
Finally, to assess changing strategic relationships, I look at defense sales, basing 
agreements, counterintelligence, and military cooperation apropos joint exercises and 
initiatives. Since the withdrawal of the British from the Gulf in 1971, the United States 
stepped into the role of security guarantor, providing numerous regimes with high quality 
weapons and generous funding to expand existing defense capabilities. The US facilitated 
these deals to secure access to key geostrategic locations in the Gulf, assure access to 
energy flows, and stabilize a tumultuous region. The US, however, was not the only arms 
seller in the Middle East. Russia and China began to supply weapons to the Gulf regimes 
in the eighties, particularly when the US refused to provide these weapons. In this 
section, I evaluate current and expected future levels of strategic cooperation between the 
US, China, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. I explore whether China is poised to take the place 
of security provider in the Gulf and examine if the Chinese have increased security 
cooperation with Gulf nations. Most importantly, I assess the extent to which US 
strategic predominance in the Gulf at risk.  
                                                
17 "Human Rights Reports." US Department of State. US Department of State. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. 
 13 
Part three offers concluding remarks by analyzing the research, assessing short 
and long term threats to the US, and offering possible policy options. By deconstructing 
shifts in economic, diplomatic, and security relationships between the US, China, Saudi 
Arabia, and Bahrain, this paper concludes that in the short-term, Chinese participation in 
the Gulf can relieve some burden from the United States. China does not have the 
military capabilities yet to ‘protect’ the Middle East, so there is little threat of US 
displacement in the next several decades. In the long-term, however, if China continues 
to rise, it is likely that the Chinese style of diplomatic and economic engagement could 
displace the influence of the United States. If China develops a military force that is 
capable of patrolling the Strait of Hormuz and supplying US-quality arms to Gulf 
regimes, in addition to safeguarding its own borders and waters, then the United States 
may have cause for unease.  
Current predictions place Chinese development at matching US military levels in 
about forty years,18 though at present China has no overseas bases or alliances to count on 
with the exception of unsteady North Korea.  China’s development trajectory suggests 
that Chinese military development will remain a priority for the Chinese, particularly as 
they acquire additional resources and assets to defend. In 2014 alone, China increased 
defense spending by 12%, bringing the Chinese military budget to $132 billion, the 
second largest in the world, behind the United States.19  
                                                
18  Capaccio, Anthony. "Chinese Military Shows New Capabilities, Pentagon Says." Bloomberg. 
Bloomberg, 6 June 2014. Web. 12 Apr. 2015.  
19 Shinkman, Paul. "China Increases Military Spending 12 Percent: Should We Worry?" US News. 
U.S.News & World Report, 5 Mar. 2014. Web. 12 Apr. 2015.  
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In the long term, the United States should explore alternative possibilities for 
bases in the Gulf and prepare for the possibility of a shift away from US led security 
agreements, arms sales, and training exercises. In the immediate future, the US should 
reassess its diplomatic strategies with GCC nations and recognize that the current US 
approach to human rights has distanced both Gulf governments and publics from 
supporting the US in the region. US human rights policies have caused tension between 
diplomats and resulted in local populations denouncing US presence in the Gulf, 
suggesting a need to reanalyze how the US can integrate human rights into its foreign 
policy while maintaining healthy strategic relationships. The Chinese diplomatic strategy 
of non-interference has the potential to edge the US out of the GCC by offering an 
alternative source of influence in the Arabian Peninsula in the next several decades.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
To adequately frame the preceding topics, this section reviews the basic 
components of US foreign policy, discusses the existing literature on the role of human 
rights in foreign policy, and finally offers an overview of key works that analyze the 
linkages in the US relationship with Gulf states. This thesis supports the view that US-
GCC relations are multifaceted, not built exclusively on oil but rather on a 
conglomeration of economic, political, and strategic interests. I echo David Forsythe, 
arguing that the US can and must find a way to maintain important strategic relationships 
without turning away from gross human rights abuses. Like Forsythe, I posit that human 
rights and security policy are not mutually exclusive; though achieving a balance is 
complicated. Unlike Forsythe, however, this paper argues that inconsistency in US 
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foreign policy is problematic and at times, counterproductive to US interests. I will offer 
suggestions for steps that could help achieve a balance between human rights and US 
foreign policy in the Gulf at the conclusion of the paper.  
Foreign Policy  
Numerous theorists have debated what characteristics define a nation’s foreign 
policy interests and strategies, though most agree on several key principles. In the 2015 
National Security Strategy, the United States government listed four basic tenets of US 
national security, all of which must be protected, promoted, and in some cases defended: 
(1) the physical security of our country, borders, and peoples at home and abroad, (2) the 
prosperity of our nation, (3) the values of our nation, and (4) international order. These 
four components are critical inputs to a nation’s foreign policy decision-making 
process.20 These components include a fusion of both liberal and realist ideals of the 
proscribed role of the state. A realist framework presumes that a state must defend its 
borders, peoples, and assets. In addition, the national security tenets also support liberal 
ideals like democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity through the promotion of 
national values and the protection of US economic prosperity. This paper will discuss the 
three most commonly cited components of foreign policy: economic, diplomatic, and 
                                                
20 Obama, Barack. "National Security Strategy 2015." National Security Strategy 2015. 2015: 7-28. White 
House. Web. 12 Apr. 2015.  
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security concerns, as they affect every nation’s calculus of its country’s national interest 
and foreign policy.21 
Human Rights Literature  
US State Department Policy Planner Sandra Vogelgesang claimed that “there is 
no simple or enduring domestic consensus behind concern for human rights in US foreign 
policy—by the executive branch, the Congress, or the American people.”22 While no 
simple consensus exists, academics and policymakers have taken sides on the efficacy of 
human rights promotion in US foreign policy: some argue human rights are an integral 
component of US policy based on American values while others insist that human rights 
promotion produces a counterproductive foreign policy strategy, though it may be a noble 
individual pursuit.  
  Historically, the US has debated “whether it should have an activist foreign policy 
on behalf of individual freedom abroad, or should lead by the more introverted model of 
constructing the good society at home.”23 Up until the mid-20th century, the US “clung to 
a commercially inspired neutrality until attacks on its shipping and military installations, 
respectively, brought it into the two world wars.”24 The US amplified its rhetoric on 
human rights during the Cold War, constructing its foreign policy partly in opposition to 
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the Soviet Union’s communist agenda. When human rights entered the national debate, 
two predominant camps emerged:  
“Wilsonian foreign policy liberals presumably take international law and human 
rights organizations seriously while Kissinger-type realists, considering national 
power and security to be the important factors in the policy-making process, 
presumably do not.”25 
An advocate for the necessary inclusion of human rights in US foreign policy, David 
Forsythe argues that, while the existence of the “twin dialectics” (of rights rhetoric and 
the realistic pursuit of national interests) results in an inconsistent US foreign policy, 
inconsistency does not necessarily result in strategic policies that are incompatible with 
human rights.26 Since the Nixon-Kissinger “policy of pure geostrategy,” human rights 
have become an important component of US foreign policy.27 Forsythe acknowledges 
that in foreign policy contexts “national security will be trump” but contends that the 
United States must be an active participant in human rights regimes in order to “exercise 
leadership or influence on the multilateral dimension of global human rights.”28 US 
leadership is necessary to maintain influence and geostrategic posturing in critical regions 
like the Middle East.  
                                                
25 Forsythe, David P. "US Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Situating Obama." Human Rights Quarterly 
33.3. 2011: 767-89. Print.  
26 Forsythe, David P. "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect." Political Science 
Quarterly 105.3. 1990: 435-54. JSTOR. Web. 4 Jan. 2015.   
27 Ibid. 452. 
28 Ibid. 453-454.  
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R.J. Vincent, author of Human Rights and International Relations, maintains that 
the very existence of an international dialogue on human rights reveals its universal 
applicability, concluding that universal human rights is not a concept bound in Western 
thought but rather a growing universal norm that should be an integral component of 
foreign policy. After the two world wars, the international community made significantly 
more space for discourse on human rights as a global norm through the creation of human 
rights treaties, regimes, and organizations to protect basic human rights. Vincent 
advocates for the inclusion of basic human rights in American foreign policy, like 
Forsythe, favoring US leadership in realizing basic human rights for the world’s poor.  
Michael Ignatieff takes a slightly different approach by acknowledging the 
necessity of a human rights dialogue, though he admits the current status of human rights 
in foreign policy is primarily political and inefficient. Ignatieff argues that conversations 
about human rights “are increasingly seen as the language of a moral imperialism”29 as 
opposed to legitimate appeals for policy change. While Ignatieff acknowledges the 
universal framework that human rights dialogue can provide, he argues that its current 
function precludes its universal application, as the United States imposes international 
human rights constraints on other violators though does not accept similar constraints 
itself.30 Ignatieff concludes, “we need to stop thinking of human rights as trumps and 
begin thinking of them as a language that creates the basis for deliberation.”31  
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30 Ibid. 287-349.  
31 Ibid. 349.  
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Those who remain more critical of including human rights in US policy cite two 
main concerns: it is not in the US national interest to do so, and when the US does 
intervene to alleviate human rights crises, the US aggravates existing problems. Realists 
like Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan argue that it is inappropriate to include moral 
considerations into US foreign policy,32 as the primary concern of the US is, first and 
foremost, to protect its territory and its citizens. 33 Kennan made the case that the 
obligations of a state inherently “have no moral quality”34 because the concerns of the 
state include the protection of its citizens and borders. The government accepts the 
responsibility to protect life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as agreed in the 
Declaration of Independence. “For these assumptions the government needs no moral 
justification, nor does it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them.”35  
Unlike Vincent, Kennan argues that there is no universal understanding or standard of 
morality.36 Further, he argues that pursuing democratic principles as an end is folly, as 
institutionalizing democracy does not guarantee US interests. The US should examine 
human rights considerations on a case by case basis, refraining from applying general 
moral doctrines to all situations.37 Kennan argues that even carefully choosing situations 
in which the US can intervene can often result in unintended consequences for the United 
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States, noting “we are demanding…a species of veto power over those of their practices 
we dislike, while denying responsibility for whatever may flow form the acceptance of 
our demands.” Finally, Kennan concludes that the inconsistency of US policies “implies a 
lack of principle in the eyes of the world; whereas morality, if not principled, is not really 
morality.”38 While there may exist a policy that incorporates elements of morality and 
human rights, according to Kennan, current and historic US policies have not achieved 
such a policy.  
Key Links in US-GCC Relations 
Finally, this section examines the key arguments about which factors are critical 
in linking US-GCC relations. Academics have published a plethora of literature 
examining Saudi Arabia’s importance as a lead oil producer as well as other GCC nations 
role in the global energy market. Similarly, political scientists have studied the political 
economy of the Gulf nations, though few have chronicled the bilateral relationship 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia at great length. Rachel Bronson opines, 
“politics and history seem all but absent from the debate over the US-Saudi 
relationship,”39 seeming to focus more on “feeding public outrage”40 than examining the 
intricacies of this important relationship. Henry Kissinger had similar reflections about 
the US strategy in the Persian Gulf and noted that,  
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Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. 5. Print. 
40 Ibid.  
 21 
“few subjects matter as much as oil, the Persian Gulf, and American foreign 
policy. But few subjects are less well understood. Even relatively sophisticated 
observers will attribute American interests in the Persian Gulf to Uncle Sam’s 
insatiable thirst for crude, combined with an effort to gain lucrative contracts for 
American oil firms.”41 
For decades, most assumed the sole basis of US-GCC relations, or bilateral relations with 
any GCC nation was oil. Saudi Arabian political scientist Naif Bin Hethlain holds a 
similar view, positing that US-Saudi interests are “characterized by overlapping interests 
and mutual dependency—the US on the Kingdom for its oil and regional influence, Saudi 
Arabia on the US for security and legitimacy.”42 Only in the last decade have scholars 
called into question the historically predominant view that the US and the Gulf nations 
base their relationship on oil agreements. As the global landscape of energy markets 
shifts, US dependence on oil is no longer (and has not been for some time) the critical 
factor in US-GCC partnerships.  
Author Rachel Bronson challenged popular assumptions by arguing that defense, 
not oil, is the basis for the Saudi-US partnership. Bronson argues in Thicker Than Oil, 
“mutual fear of the Soviet Union’s expanding global influence, predicated on strategic 
and religious realities, provided a protective political layer that enveloped oil and defense 
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interests.”43 Geostrategic interests, primarily the containment of the Soviet Union, 
defined US-Saudi interests for decades.44 It was only the collapse of the Soviet Union 
that changed the US-Saudi relationship from focusing on the Soviet communist threat to 
“new issues, including counterterrorism, political reform, and stability in Iraq.”45  
Similarly, Henry Kissinger and Walter Mead argue that US interests in the Gulf 
are tied to both defense and oil, though not exclusively so. Kissinger and Mead argue that 
the most important link to the Gulf is the US intention to “maintain the security of world 
trade over the seas and air while also ensuring that international economic transactions 
take place in an orderly way.”46 US access to the Suez Canal, the Bab Al-Mandar Strait 
and the Strait of Hormuz remains crucial for facilitating the free flow of goods, including 
oil, critical to US national interests and economic prosperity.  
The following thesis attempts to move the literature in a different direction, 
understanding the inherent linkages between human rights and security policy, 
acknowledging that one can be used to strengthen the other though neither can be blindly 
pursued.  
Theoretically, the idea of incorporating human rights into foreign policy is sound. 
Realistically, it is imprudent to suggest that the US consistently should place human 
rights considerations before or instead of US national interests in foreign affairs. While 
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the pursuit of human rights is an ethical endeavor, it should not be the sole responsibility 
or moral obligation of the United States to enforce. The US cannot defend or pursue 
every human rights violation abroad at the expense of US interests though it can chose 
those nations in which US interests and the cessation of human rights abuses are not 
mutually exclusive. Alternatively, the US can weigh situations where protecting human 
rights trumps national security interests and decide to take action.  
Institutions like the UN and the ICC exist (in part) to defend and protect human 
rights where the state cannot or will not do so. The US is an important actor in those 
institutions and should make a point to support the missions by providing substantial aid, 
intelligence, and support. This thesis distinguishes between the role of the United States 
as a bilateral actor and the role of the US as an international actor in global institutions. It 
is worth underscoring that the two are not consistently mutually exclusive. The US can 
pursue bilaterally what it pursues in a multilateral international context though the two 
policies are not required to be identical. When the US is forced to prioritize one interest 
over the other, the primary role of the state is to protect itself and its people.  
The current application of human rights poses a problem. The weakness of US 
human rights policy derives from inconsistency, uneven application, and public shaming, 
often resulting in accusations of unfairness and hypocrisy in the international sphere. 
Current policies, like the one in Bahrain, send contradictory diplomatic signals. The US 
praises developments and criticizes issues simultaneously and publicly, generating 
resentment against US policies that locals view as prescriptive. If the US does choose to 
incorporate human rights into its foreign policy, (either in pursuit of US interests and/or 
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in an effort to protect the human rights of a persecuted group in another country) it should 
be a consistent component of US policy in the country supported by military, economic, 
and diplomatic actions as well. Human rights cannot be a moral high ground from which 
the US creates or discusses its foreign policy or applies it sporadically when it is 
politically convenient. Inconsistent diplomatic pressure applied to human rights 
violations is not only ineffective in terms of ending the human rights abuse, but also has 
created resentment from both allies and enemies abroad who view the United States’ 
irregular efforts to promote human rights as a political stratagem, devoid of humanitarian 
nature.  
 The potential strength of US human rights policy, however, lies in the United 
States’ ability to promote universal norms as agreed in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights by backing those values with military strength and international 
institutions. The US is one of the few nations who have the ability to defend the rights of 
others abroad. US leadership must recognize this role but use it wisely. The US can 
leverage its position as an important international actor to initiate a response to human 
rights abuses through diplomatic backchannels. As previously stated, the US is not able 
to pursue all human rights abuses abroad. The US should instead focus on using its 
political leverage to advocate for human rights either privately in a bilateral context or 
through multilateral institutions.  
The literature on human rights acknowledges this disconnect between idealism 
and practicality in applying human rights principles. This thesis attempts to offer tangible 
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policy approaches through which US foreign policy can be efficient, appropriate, and 
cognizant of human rights without sacrificing US national security or interests.  
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Historical Context  
US STRATEGIC POLICY IN THE GULF  
Standard Oil of California, a US petroleum company,47 struck oil in eastern Saudi 
Arabia in 1936 quickly launching US involvement in the region. From the 1930s on, as 
US companies transferred American assets and citizens to Saudi Arabia to expand oil 
exploration efforts. 48 Commercial ties quickly turned into diplomatic ones, necessary to 
facilitate the budding economic developments and interaction between the two nations. 
The US established official diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1940.49 A single, 
albeit major oil discovery opened the door to American involvement in the Gulf which 
would eventually solidify access to energy as a critical component of US foreign policy 
considerations in the region.50  
At the time, Britain had been the dominant political actor in the Middle East for 
decades. Its colonial empire reached far into the Arabian Gulf. Britain had close colonial 
ties with the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Jordan and the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula. 
The British cemented their regional influence by establishing “bases [that] encircled the 
[Saudi] kingdom.”51 The Saudis viewed the US entry into the Gulf as “a longed-for 
counterweight to Britain’s regional dominance,”52 a role the US readily accepted. The 
roots of Saudi-US cooperation laid the foundation for a unique and resilient diplomatic 
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relationship in the years to come. The US increased its involvement in the Gulf after 
WWII by forging stronger political and military partnerships in the region. In 1946, the 
US received approval from the Saudis to build an airbase in Dhahran, known as the 
United States Military Training Mission.53,54  By permitting American military bases in 
Saudi Arabia, the Saudi royal family fostered decades of joint military and security 
cooperation, though would also become a point of contention during periods of tension in 
the Middle East, particularly when US and Saudi interests diverged.55  
The start of the Cold War initiated a significant shift in US policy in the Middle 
East. President Eisenhower’s administration began to view the Gulf as a crucial 
geopolitical nexus and potential buffer zone between the communist East and the 
democratic West, noting, “The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, 
would today be prized more than ever by international communism.”56  The US only 
truly cemented political relationships with Middle Eastern regimes when President 
Eisenhower publicly denounced the British attack on the Suez Canal in 1956. The US 
reaction “enhanced America’s image in the region”57 and secured a pro-Western and 
more specifically, pro-American leaning in the Gulf nations, which remained staunch 
anti-communists throughout the Cold War.  
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After the very public British failure to retake the Suez Canal, British influence 
decreased substantially, paving the way for the Gulf nations to declare independence and 
US influence to enter. Eisenhower took steps to ensure a US alliance with the regimes of 
the Middle East when in 1957 he requested that “Congress pass a resolution authorizing 
him to pledge increased economic and military aid and even direct US protection to any 
Middle Eastern nation willing to acknowledge the threat posed by international 
communism.”58 The US carried out its commitment to its new anti-communist allies and 
established diplomatic relations with each Gulf nation the year it declared independence: 
Kuwait in 1961, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar in 1971, and finally Oman in 1972.  
This period was not, however, one of perpetual harmony between the US and the 
Gulf countries, as the newly created republics grew anxious when the British withdrew 
from the Gulf in 1971, leaving a power vacuum. The Shah of Iran seized the opportunity 
to fill the resultant power vacuum under the aegis of his American allies. When the 
Americans failed to intervene to protect the Shah from revolutionaries in 1979, the 
leaders of the Gulf nations questioned US willingness to protect their regimes if unrest 
ever ensued, leading to tense diplomatic relations.59 Shortly after 1979, the Carter 
administration attempted to mollify the Gulf rulers by announcing the Carter Doctrine in 
1980. The Carter Doctrine declared,  
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“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region [and 
thereby endanger the flow of oil] will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force.”60  
The Gulf regimes accepted this small assurance from President Carter though they 
continued to view US promises with caution. The Carter Doctrine cemented the vital 
linkage between US interests and access to oil in the region and later justified US 
participation in three wars in the Gulf.61 Throughout this period, US-GCC relations 
revolved primarily around oil (for the US) and security (for the Gulf nations).  
Fears of Gulf nations turning to communism evaporated at the end of the Cold 
War, signaling a new focus for US-Gulf relations. No longer focused on the spread of 
communism, President H.W. Bush outlined his New World Order in an address before a 
joint session of Congress in March 1991, declaring, “we must work together to create 
shared security arrangements in the region…Let it be clear: Our vital national interests 
depend on a stable and secure Gulf.”62  The winding down of the Cold War resulted in 
greater focus on stability and a budding defense relationship between the US and GCC 
nations. For instance, as the Soviet threat lessened, Western powers “reduced their 
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procurement budgets”63 while defense contractors ramped up sales to foreign 
governments, a business that “became a critical profit center,”64 for both the US 
government and the defense industry.  
Only two years after the Cold War ended, the US-Gulf relationship was 
threatened by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. US soldiers arrived to defend Kuwait against 
Iraqi aggression, solidifying military cooperation and trust between the US and Gulf 
nations. The Carter Doctrine held strong though the Gulf War revealed the inadequacies 
of Gulf defense capabilities, leading the US and several GCC states to sign “bilateral 
defense agreements… including Bahrain in 1991, Qatar in 1992, and the UAE in 1994.”65 
Access agreements and the establishment of more US military bases quickly followed, 
substantially bolstering US presence in the Gulf66 and facilitating interoperability 
between US and Gulf military forces.  
In sum, throughout the Cold War and the Gulf War, the focus of the US-Saudi 
relationship was “oil for security.”67 In an address to Congress after the declaration of the 
cease-fire in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared, “our commitment to peace in 
the Middle East does not end with the liberation of Kuwait.” The twenty first century 
would bring with it significant changes to the foundation of the US-GCC relationship, 
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pivoting away from ‘oil for security’ to focus on security and increasingly, on human 
rights. US relations with the Gulf regimes developed over time though reached their apex 
in the days before September 11, when memories of the US liberation of Kuwait still 
evoked feelings of cooperation and mutual defense.  
September 11, 2001 and the Aftermath  
The attacks of September 11 forced the US to fundamentally reshape its policy in 
the Gulf. The 19 terrorists who planned the attacks of September 11 hailed from mostly 
GCC countries, 15 from Saudi Arabia alone. US citizens, media, and politicians 
expressed outrage, pointing out “the limits of Saudi cooperation, and attribut[ing] the rise 
of al-Qa’ida to Saudi decisions to encourage virulent anti-American rhetoric in place of 
dissent.”68 Journalists turned their attention toward “the rigid traditionalism of Saudi 
society, particularly its treatment of women,”69 bringing human rights back to the 
forefront of US foreign policy in the Middle East. In response, in 2003, the Bush 
administration increased support for democratic reforms that aimed to target the root 
causes of terrorism throughout the Middle East70 stating, “the United States has adopted a 
new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East”71 adding that democracy 
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“must be a focus of American policy in the decades to come.”72 President Bush went so 
far as to state,  
“Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom 
in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run stability 
cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains 
a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, 
resentment, and violence ready for export.”73 
The Bush administration created programs like the Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI) in 2002 and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiatives (BMENA) in 
2004 in order to build civil society in the Middle East vis-à-vis bottom up programs 
designed to embed democratic ideals into Middle Eastern contexts.  
These efforts followed the US invasion of Iraq and later Afghanistan, a military 
venture that the Sunni royal families of the Gulf firmly opposed. As part of its new plan 
to eradicate terrorism, the US “established military bases in all GCC countries, save 
[increasing US presence in] Saudi Arabia,”74 whose own citizens expressed anger at 
“American support for Israel, military action in Afghanistan, and detention of Arab 
prisoners,”75 through initiating a “fall-off of tourism, consumer boycotts of American 
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products, and the divestment of billions of dollars.”76 The Saudi government “ruled out 
attacks on any other Arab country from their soil, and also hinted in advance that any 
American request to launch sorties against targets in Afghanistan from their bases would 
not be welcome.”77  
Bahrain, on the other hand, offered the US a place to base its operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Manama opened its doors to serve as a forward operating base for US 
NAVCENT and MARCENT. The UAE and Kuwait also offered space for US Air Force 
bases.78 On March 25, 2002, the close strategic relationship with the government of 
Bahrain led President Bush to call Bahrain a “major non-NATO US ally,” a label the 
small country accepted proudly.79  
The increase in US military presence in the Gulf served to fortify the security-
oriented nature of the US relationships with the GCC nations. It also intimated the 
balance of regional power dynamics. Saudi Arabia had a record of refusing US requests, 
only publicly allowing US troops to utilize Saudi bases when it was politically feasible. 
Contrastingly, Bahrain did not have a long record of refusing US requests for military 
cooperation, nor did Bahrain hold the political sway to deny US requests like its 
neighbor, Saudi Arabia.  
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The attacks of September 11 forced Riyadh and Washington to reexamine their 
special relationship because “it was no longer realistic to imagine that Saudi religious 
influence could be used to promote US security and political interests within the 
region.”80 Similarly, the American public demanded a tougher reaction to the Saudis, 
angered by suspected Saudi contributions to financing terrorism against the United States. 
In this context, Saudi Arabia began to search for alternative political partners.  
In 2005, after the death of Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, King Abdullah ascended the 
throne of Saudi Arabia and immediately announced a major shift in the oil kingdom’s 
foreign policy, which he termed Saudi’s “Look East” trade policy.81 The “Look East” 
policy aimed for “over half of Saudi oil exports [to be] bound for Asia,”82 highlighting 
Saudi Arabia’s intent to diversify its global alliances, economically but also 
diplomatically. After the attacks of September 11, “when we [Saudi Arabia] started 
looking around, nobody was there because we had never built relationships with Russia 
or China. And we thought, Let’s build bridges with other countries.”83 And so, the slow 
pivot away from the US began.  
From the perspective of the Gulf rulers, President Obama’s inauguration in 2009 
seemed to present a hopeful change in US foreign policy, promising a withdrawal of US 
troops from Iraq and Afghanistan in addition to greater attention to an alienated Middle 
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East. Indeed, President Obama traveled to Egypt where he spoke at Cairo University and 
declared, 
“I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and 
Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; 
and one based upon the truth that American and Islam are not exclusive, and need 
not be in competition.”84 
The US and Gulf countries improved their respective bilateral relations until 2011, when 
the political, military, and economic relationships around the Middle East began to 
crumble. In early 2011, the uprisings known as the “Arab Spring” destabilized many of 
the Gulf nations as revolutions spread across the Middle East, toppling regimes and 
spreading instability across the region. “The GCC countries, with the notable exception 
of Bahrain, succeeded in largely avoiding mass protest movements as observed in many 
other parts of the Arab world,”85 though remained vulnerable, as “democratization 
demands”86 appeared in Kuwait, Oman, and other GCC states. Success in “avoiding mass 
protest movements” stemmed from the swift action taken by the Gulf governments 
against protesters. The Saudis, Bahrainis and Kuwaitis quickly crushed rebellions by 
using force against those gathered in the streets, killing the momentum of the movements 
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before they could gain a strong footing.87 In response to the repressive techniques used by 
nearly all of the Gulf regimes against their citizens, the US placed a hold on its FMS and 
increased pressure on the Gulf governments to stop human rights violations and reform 
the existing governments. While some believe Obama sided with corrupt regimes for too 
long, others claim Obama abandoned long time partners like Hosni Mubarak. In reality, 
like most presidents before him, Obama attempted to balance contradictory concerns in 
the Middle East: security and human rights. Unfortunately, the awkward balance failed 
on both accounts, isolating both Gulf military partners and human rights groups.  
Public political pressure negatively affected the political relationships between the 
US and the Gulf countries. Regional leaders began to speculate about the value of 
inviting US involvement in the region. If the United States would not provide Gulf 
leaders with the weapons and the political support they needed to retain their grip on 
power, they would seek alternative partners. China, India, and Russia began to offer the 
military and security resources the US refused to provide, a trend that Gulf based political 
analyst Theodore Karasik suggests emanates from some of the Gulf nations becoming 
“fed up with what is perceived to be being told what to buy for their threat 
environment…the UAE and Saudi Arabia are now buying what they need through 
creative shopping lists…on equipment that not only they need but what their allies 
in the region require as key neighboring countries disintegrate.”88  
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Instead of providing arms to the Gulf regimes, the Obama administration refused to 
intervene militarily though continued to dedicate funding to democracy and human rights 
in the broader Middle East, highlighting the need for liberal reforms in the Arabian Gulf, 
much to the dismay of the Arab leaders. Tense diplomatic relations,  
“surfaced strongly in 2011 due to the Saudi king’s anger at Washington’s 
response to Arab uprisings, especially at its abandonment of Hosni Mubarak, the 
deposed Egyptian president, who was a long-time Saudi and US Ally, and the 
American call for political reforms in Bahrain.”89  
From the point of view of the Gulf leaders, the quick abandonment of long time allies 
confirmed the need for Gulf rulers to expand their economic and political partnerships, 
spurring GCC leaders to pursue diplomatic relationships with growing economic partners 
in the east. Though President Obama’s term began with hope for strengthened relations 
with its Middle East partners, it devolved quickly. As the revolutions continued to unfold 
President Obama’s approach to the uprisings coupled with the US response to Syria and 
later ISIS and Iran fueled distrust between the Gulf monarchs and the US president. 
While the US-GCC relationship is no longer predicated on oil, its long, complex history 
presents a variety of factors that contribute to the current status of US policy in the Gulf.  
The Chinese approach, detailed below, reveals a fundamentally different history 
and approach to GCC relations, critical to understanding contemporary Chinese 
interactions in the Arabian Peninsula.  
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CHINESE STRATEGIC POLICY IN THE GULF  
 Mao Zedong declared the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949,90 
and announced its official foreign policy in 1954. Maoist foreign policy emanated from 
the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” which include, “mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”91 China 
structures its foreign policies vis-à-vis broad principles and slogans, with government 
statements on human rights revealing careful word choice and intent.92 The tendency to 
speak in broad principles remains the hallmark of Chinese foreign policy.  
China established official diplomatic relations with Kuwait (and Iran) in 1971.”93 
Shortly after, China solidified ties with Oman in 1978, the UAE in 1981, Qatar in 1988, 
and Bahrain in 1989. 94 Outreach to Saudi Arabia came at the end of the Cold War, in 
1990.  
After the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, “the Middle East appeared to assume a 
new importance for China”95 because of the warm diplomatic welcome offered by the 
Arab nations, while much of the rest of the world publicly condemned Chinese actions. 
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Oman, the UAE, and Kuwait opened their arms to President Yang Shangkun because 
“the Gulf countries did not criticize China’s harsh treatment of the demonstrators and 
considered the matter as part of China’s internal affairs.” 96,97  
This deepening diplomatic relationship mirrored newly developing economic ties 
and trade linkages. In the early nineties, as China’s demand for oil skyrocketed the 
partnership between the GCC nations and China strengthened. “Chinese exports grew 
450% between 1992 and 2006.”98 Chinese growth skyrocketed, as did its increasing 
domestic demand and energy consumption. China sought access to resources like oil, gas, 
copper, and rare-earth metals to fuel its continued growth. By pursuing economic 
relationships with countries rich in scarce resources, China facilitated its sustained 
economic progress. China is now the largest energy consumer and producer in the 
world.99 In comparison to the rest of the world, China became the world’s largest 
consumer of primary materials (like metal ores, fossil fuels, and biomass) with domestic 
consumption levels four times larger than the US.100 “The two-way trade between Saudi 
Arabia and China in the last two decades increased almost 58 times from $1.28 billion in 
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1990 to about $74 billion in 2012.”101 Researcher Chietigj Bajpaee argues, “China's 
primary interest in the Middle East has been to gain access to the region's vast oil and gas 
supplies.”102 In 2012, Qatar supplied China with 34% of its LNG imports; nearly double 
the amount of any other nation.103 In 2013, Saudi Arabia supplied 19% of China’s crude 
oil imports, though GCC nations cumulatively provided 35%, more than a third of 
China’s energy demands.104 Finally, “In 2012 China overtook the US to become Saudi 
Arabia’s top trade partner.”105 Chinese investments and burgeoning trade relations with 
the GCC positioned it to become an alternative source of influence in the Middle East 
with pundits claiming that China “is becoming a major US competitor for political 
inﬂuence in the Persian Gulf.”106  
Meanwhile by the mid 2000s, the Chinese also began a quiet public relations 
campaign to flood the media with non-western alternatives, increasing cultural exchange 
initiatives and encouraging foreign language learning. In a rare move, the Chinese 
government agreed to partner with Al-Jazeera to produce Arabic and Chinese 
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broadcasts.107 In what author Ben Simpfendorfer calls “the new public relations war,” Al 
Jazeera has been conducting interviews in Arabic with high-level Chinese officials from 
the Foreign Ministry, Chinese Radio International, and the Cultural Ministry. Al Jazeera 
recorded a three hour special entitled “Eye on China,” speaking with various Chinese 
nationals who spoke Arabic about China’s one child policy, tourism, and Muslims in 
China, at times for over an hour in fluent Arabic.108 The series even included “images of 
Muslims praying in mosques and welcoming visiting Arab Imams.”109  
Al Jazeera is not the only news media tapping into potential markets linking the 
Arab world to China: The People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, and Xinhua have reporters 
based around the Middle East, reporting in both Arabic and Chinese.110 Also indicative of 
increasingly interrelated interests is China’s booming translation business. Arab traders 
routinely visit several business centers in China, including Guangzhou and Yiwu, a 
province that places the estimate of Arabic translators in the city at one thousand for 
Yiwu alone.111 Simpfendorfer argues, “the Arabic-speaking officials in Beijing are…part 
of a deliberate government strategy to build bridges in the Arab world. Language is the 
hidden glue to relations.” Comparatively, only one US government official has appeared 
speaking on Al-Jazeera in Arabic; Alberto Fernandez, who later stepped down after 
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making a mistake while speaking in Arabic, describing the US policy in Iraq as mired in 
“stupidity.”112 
China has also increased efforts to attract Arab tourists, creating “an international 
tourism destination for the Muslim world.”113 Chinese officials announced the 
construction of “World Muslim City” to be completed by 2020. The city will “consist of 
23 sub-projects including a World Muslim Folk Culture Street, a convention center and 
high end hotels.”114 In addition, China hosts an Arabic Arts festival annually, to celebrate 
art in the Muslim world and invite Muslims from various nations to celebrate their culture 
and holy language, Arabic.115 Reciprocally, in 2013, Bahrain welcomed a “Chinese 
painting and calligraphy exhibition, which hosted more than 30 renowned contemporary 
Chinese artists.”116 
Finally, China has opened dozens of international schools that teach the Arabic 
language, from primary school to university level education. In the Arab world, the 
University of Dubai opened the Confucius Institute in 2011, designed to increase cultural 
exchange between the Arab world and China.117 In addition, the Confucius Institute has 
begun training the Department of Economic Development in Dubai, the Dubai Police 
Academy, and airport officials in order to facilitate communication with its many 
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Chinese visitors and diplomats.118 Students from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United 
Arab Emirates, among others have studied at numerous universities in China, facilitating 
exchange programs for Chinese students in the Gulf as well.119 It is clear that China’s 
historic and contemporary diplomatic linkages with the Gulf States extend well beyond 
economic ties, as the Chinese are working to facilitate not only a transactional 
relationship, but a partnership based on cultural exchange and understanding.   
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PART II: CASE STUDIES  
 
Saudi Arabia 
The largest country in the GCC, Saudi Arabia’s landmass covers over 80% of the 
Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia’s geographic breadth matches its political reach, as 
Saudi Arabia’s mandate as the protector of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina 
solidifies its position as religious leader of the Muslim world. Beyond the Muslim world, 
Saudi Arabia’s strategic use of its natural resources of oil and gas helped establish the 
newly formed nation as a global leader and strategic economic partner early on. The 
United States recognized this power in the 1930s and moved quickly to assist the Saudis 
in building physical, political, and economic infrastructure.120 As Saudi power increased 
over the decades, Saudi Arabia and Iran began to vie for regional predominance, a feud 
that has dominated much of Middle Eastern conflict in the last three decades. This 
tension also prompted US strategic support for Saudi Arabia by way of arms sales and 
defense cooperation agreements.  
The Saudi Arabia case study is organized into three parts: the economic, 
diplomatic, and strategic relationships, focusing on the significant changes in relations 
between the US and Saudi Arabia and China and Saudi Arabia. 
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ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP 
  
 
In 1936, when Standard Oil of California struck oil in eastern Saudi Arabia, the 
United States and Saudi Arabia established a relationship based on mutual oil interests.121  
The United States and Saudi Arabia have continued to boast “a strategic partnership since 
World War II based on a common understanding -- Saudi Arabia provides the US with 
oil and the US in turn provides a security umbrella to the Kingdom.”122 
While the special oil relationship is significant, conventional wisdom has assumed 
falsely that the US imports a large majority of its oil from Saudi Arabia. In recent years, 
Americans have expressed particular concern over the US dependence on Middle Eastern 
oil and pushed for “oil independence.”123 When polled in 2014, 3 out of 4 Americans 
thought that the US imported the majority of its oil from somewhere in the Middle 
East.124 58% stated that the US imports the most oil from Saudi Arabia.125 
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Figure 1. Where the US Gets its Oil   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For decades, the United States has imported less than 25% of its oil from all the 
nations in the Persian Gulf combined. 126 A quarter of oil imports from the Persian Gulf is 
a significant number, though should be contextualized with US imports on a broader 
scale. Canada, for instance, supplies the US with more than a quarter of its oil imports 
alone. In 2012, Saudi Arabia’s exports to the US totaled only 8.1% of all US oil imports 
overall. Saudi Arabia’s oil exports do not impact American markets or strategy to the 
extent that the media or the general public assumes they do.  
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In 2012, the EIA reported that the United States imported nearly the same amount 
of crude oil from Africa as it did from the Persian Gulf.127 In 2013, the EIA recorded that 
Saudi Arabia counted for 13% of US petroleum imports, slightly higher than the previous 
year, though still comparatively small to the quantities imported from North American 
and Latin American countries. As the graph detailing US annual net crude imports 
depicts, between 2003-2013, Canada was the single largest exporter of crude oil to the 
US. Imports from North America (Canada, Mexico, and South America) accounted for 
half of all US crude imports. Saudi Arabia, while significant, was not the only nor the 
most important producer for the United States.  
Figure 2. US Annual Net Crude Imports 
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The table below highlights how in the last decade, the nature of the global oil 
markets have changed considerably. In the last three decades, traditional 
consumer/producer relationships shifted as petroleum consumption patterns varied; the 
overall share of Asian demand for oil increased steadily while the share of US and 
European petroleum demands decreased from 2000-2010. Oil demand began slowly 
shifting to Asia while US consumption declined simultaneously, representing a 
fundamental shift in the world energy market.  
Figure 3. World Petroleum Consumption by Region 
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At the same time, new oil and gas production technologies like fracking and 
horizontal drilling increased production capacity in certain countries, especially the 
United States and Canada. A slight decrease in US oil demand after 2005 and a soaring 
increase in demand from Asia led to a shift in the trade patterns of global energy markets. 
Increased production and declining consumption in North America contrasted with rising 
demand in Asian industrial nations. This led large oil producers like Saudi Arabia to 
fundamentally alter their approach to oil sales. In particular, changing demand forced 
Saudi Arabia to focus on new buyers for its oil. The Saudi government took note of the 
change in energy markets and took necessary steps to reposition their economic 
relationships to ensure the steady flow of money into Saudi coffers.  
Figure 4. Saudi Arabia’s Crude Exports to China and US  
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As US demand for oil decreased the United States began to restructure its relationship 
with Saudi Arabia.   
Before turning to the Chinese-Saudi partnership, it is critical to examine the 
components of this shifting economic partnership between the US and Saudi Arabia. 
While the China-Saudi partnership strengthened, the US-Saudi partnership transitioned 
from an oil-centric relationship to an economic partnership based on mutually beneficial 
economic linkages including non-oil trade, cultural exchange programs, and business 
partnerships. Despite a weakened oil relationship, strong trade continued between the 
United States and the Kingdom, with both countries devoted to diversifying their bilateral 
trade. In 2012, Saudi Arabia imported nearly $12 billion of goods from the US, second 
only to China.128 The Office of the United States Trade Representative noted that Saudi 
Arabia was the United States' 19th largest goods export market in 2013, with the major 
products imported including: “Vehicles ($5.8 billion), Machinery ($3.6 billion), Aircraft 
($2.1 billion), Electrical Machinery ($1.4 billion), and Optic and Medical Instruments 
($923 million).”129 The State Department reported, “Saudi Arabia is one of the largest US 
export markets in the Middle East,”130 accounting for nearly 1% of US exports 
worldwide. In fact, US exports to Saudi Arabia in 2013 were $19 billion, up 5.7% ($1 
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billion) from 2012, and up 313% from 2003,131 highlighting the serious efforts made by 
the US and Saudi Arabia to maintain strong economic ties, based on non-petroleum 
products.  
Moreover, numerous US firms operate on Saudi soil, linking the two countries’ 
economies together through mutually beneficial economic partnerships. The International 
Trade Administration highlights “the fact that the Saudi currency or riyal is pegged to the 
US dollar, [and] the pro-American outlook of Saudi business circles…make Saudi Arabia 
an indispensable partner for US companies who are serious about doing business in the 
Middle East.”132  Even more revealing, the United States Treasury Department created a 
special bureau “to accommodate Saudi needs, the Office of Saudi Arabian Affairs… the 
only such office for any foreign country.”133 In The Vital Triangle, authors Jon 
Alternman and John Garver note, “it is estimated that the United States receives about 60 
percent of Saudi foreign direct investment (FDI),”134 a number the contributes to 
significant economic, technological and personal exchange between the two nations. 
Saudi Arabia continues to heavily invest in the United States and link its economic 
development to its American partner.  
 Saudi Arabia and the United States have also continued to invest in building 
economic relationships vis-à-vis educational exchanges, exemplified by institutions such 
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as New York University, the Cleveland Clinic, and the Guggenheim which serve as 
centers of cultural exchange, laying the professional and personal foundations for future 
engagement between the two nations. 135 The Arab Times reported that in 2010, “the US 
exported over $ 5 billion in education, business, and professional consulting services to 
Saudi Arabia,”136 highlighting to the trend of investing in economic and intellectual 
exchanges. In 2014, over 110,000 students from Saudi Arabia alone studied in the United 
States, contributing to the economy but more importantly establishing personal and 
professional relationships in the US.137 
While the United States maintains a strong economic partnership with Saudi 
Arabia, the bilateral partners no longer base their relationship on oil imports or energy in 
general. The US-Saudi economic relationship revolves around trade, investment flows, 
business, and educational exchanges. The China-Saudi relationship, on the other hand, is 
beginning to revolve around China’s insatiable oil demand and Saudi Arabia’s seemingly 
endless supply. As the US-Saudi oil link wanes, the China-Saudi oil link is waxing. “The 
true winner of economic competition in the Middle East is the power that can maximize 
its trade with the region (especially in energy resources) while minimizing its political 
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and material involvement.”138 If that is the case, in the last decade China began to emerge 
as the true winner.  
As early as 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah “supported the diversification of Saudi 
Arabia’s economy away from the United States,” resulting in US firms losing “lucrative 
Saudi gas contracts to…major Russian, Chinese, and French companies.”139 In 2004, the 
governments of Saudi Arabia and China began to take previously unimaginable steps 
towards integrating their economies. 2004 heralded a significant step, when in a rare 
move Saudi Arabia “granted Sinopec (China’s national oil company) a concession to 
explore and produce natural gas in Saudi Arabia.” Three years later in 2007, Sinopec and 
Saudi Aramaco signed a deal “to expand capacity of the Quanzhou refinery”140 in China. 
Sinopec reported that they were upgrading the refinery specifically to process Saudi 
Arabia’s oil type, a sour crude.141 The deal was significant because as the Chinese began 
investing in refinery infrastructure, China effectively guaranteed Saudi Arabia an export 
market for the near future. The Chinese have continued building facilities to process sour 
crude at a rapid pace to increase their refining capabilities, linking their oil demands 
closer with Saudi Arabia’s supply.  
 In 2005, after the death of Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, King Abdullah ascended 
the throne of Saudi Arabia and immediately announced a major shift in the oil kingdom’s 
                                                
138 Alternman, Jon, and John Garver. "The Vital Triangle." Center for Strategic and International Studies 
30.2 (2008): 109. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Web. 12 Apr. 2015.  
139 Bronson, Rachel. "Reconfiguring the US-Saudi Strategic Partnership." Thicker than Oil: America's 
Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. 251. Print. 
140 Simpfendorfer, Ben. "Introduction." The New Silk Road: How a Rising Arab World Is Turning Away 
from the West and Rediscovering China. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 35. Print. 
141 "Sinopec, Exxonmobil, Saudi Aramco and Fujian Petrochemical Sign Agreements to Progress Fujian 
Manufacturing and Marketing Projects." Sinopec Corp. Sinopec Corp., 26 Aug. 2004. Web. 24 Mar. 2015.  
 54 
foreign and economic policies, which he termed Saudi’s “Look East” trade policy.142 
Consequentially, the Saudi national oil company, Saudi Aramco shifted its oil exports 
eastward, following the changing flows of trade toward eastern markets. Saudi Aramco’s 
president and CEO, Khalid A. al-Falih affirmed that the dwindling American demand for 
oil imports paired with “the growing importance of China represent[s] a fundamental 
shift in the geopolitics of oil… and a long-term transition.”143 Moreover, in 2007, “Saudi 
Aramco, Sinopec, and the US’ ExxonMobil concluded an agreement to fund a 
petrochemical complex and refinery in Fujian province to process Saudi heavy crude. 
There are now proposals for a second refinery.”144 “The writing is on the wall. China is 
the growth market for petroleum.”145  
2009 was another significant year for the global energy market in general and 
Saudi Arabia specifically, for several reasons: the US shale boom occurred, the global 
economic downturn shocked the world’s financial markets, and the Chinese, for the first 
time, overtook the United States as the “top buyer of Saudi oil.”146 During this period, the 
Saudis and the Chinese formalized the importance of their budding energy relationship by 
signing economic agreements to foster “the growing financial and technical cooperation 
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in the petrochemicals sector.”147 The trade agreement’s importance lies in the long lasting 
impact it launched; establishing energy agreements with China “increased the stakes that 
others [China] have in Saudi Arabia, which reduces American influence, particularly in 
the commercial realm.”148  
Two years later, 2011 marked a “hallmark year” for Chinese-GCC trade when 
“for the first time since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries, 
China overtook the US to become Saudi Arabia’s top trade partner”149 overall. Not only 
was China buying the largest share of Saudi oil, China diversified its purchases from 
Saudi Arabia to include petrochemicals, plastics, and metals like aluminum. The 
Kingdom provided China with about 20 per cent of its oil imports in 2013, or around 1.1 
million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia became China’s 9th biggest source of imports in 
2013, supplying goods and services worth nearly $54 billion. China has retained the title 
of the largest supplier of goods and services to the kingdom since 2011 in part by 
continually entering into new trade deals, and Saudi Arabia remains the largest single oil 
supplier to China. In early 2013, “a number of potentially significant deals were 
concluded during the visit [of the Chinese delegation] including a civil nuclear pact with 
Saudi Arabia for help with the Kingdom’s plan for a $100 billion program for 16 nuclear 
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reactors by 2030.”150 Chinese cooperation with Saudi Arabia on nuclear program 
development suggests not only an economic interest, but perhaps implies that the Chinese 
are beginning to profit from the security dilemma between the Iranians and the Saudis.  
Economic linkages between the US and Saudi Arabia and China and Saudi Arabia 
translate to varying degrees of political influence in the region. Economically, Chinese oil 
demand is translating into more economic influence for the Chinese in the Kingdom, due 
to the fact that “Saudi Arabia is China’s major oil partner…and China’s Saudi imports 
account for more than half its total imports form the Arab world.”151  It is likely that the 
Chinese pursuit of Gulf resources is a reflection of its quest to acquire nearly unlimited 
resource access, amongst other things, like strengthened diplomatic partnerships. As Ben 
Simpfendorfer explains, “China is projecting its economic force in the Arab world, but 
America is still the region’s most powerful military and political force.”152 While 
America still maintains its position as the world’s most powerful military, the economic 
sway the US once held as primary importer of Saudi oil has decreased significantly in 
recent years. As former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Charles Freeman opined,  
“The Arabs see a partner who will buy their oil without demanding that they 
accept a foreign ideology, abandon their way of life or make other choices 
they would rather avoid. They see (in China) a country that is far away and has 
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no imperial agenda in their region, but which is internationally influential and 
likely in time to be militarily powerful.”153  
Oil is no longer the glue that holds the US-Saudi relationship together. 
Policymakers must abandon this flawed assumption. The US-Saudi economic partnership 
remains important, but is no longer the predominant factor in US-Saudi relations overall.  
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP 
  
In general, the United States is silent on Saudi Arabia’s human rights record. 
There is little publicly available information that details direct US commentary or 
criticism of Saudi Arabia’s policies. Historically, the United States has shied from public 
criticism of Saudi Arabia where “hesitation and caution long prevailed over the 
confrontation of difficult [diplomatic] issues.”154 Human rights groups have critiqued the 
United States for its relative silence surrounding human rights issues in Saudi Arabia in 
comparison with the vocal condemnation of neighboring countries’ human rights 
policies. For instance, Human Rights Watch noted, “In Saudi Arabia, 2013 was another 
bad year for human rights,” but “US public criticism of Saudi Arabia's human rights 
record has been limited for many years.”155 Marc Lynch spoke of the sobering reality of 
                                                
153 Bailey, Robert. "China And GCC: Growing Ties." Gulf Business. Gulf Business, 16 Apr. 2013. Web. 8 
Dec. 2014 
154 Jehl, Douglas. "Holy War Lured Saudis As Rulers Looked Away." The New York Times. The New 
York Times, 26 Dec. 2001. Web. 8 Dec. 2014.  
155 Coogle, Adam. "The Deafening US Silence on Saudi Rights." Human Rights Watch. Foreign Policy, 
28 Jan. 2014. Web. 9 Dec. 2014 
 58 
“the Saudi exception,” referring to US silence on Saudi human rights abuses, which he 
argued lessens America’s credibility in the region.156  
On rare occasions, the US directly responded to Saudi human rights violations, 
though mostly communicated neutral, official reactions through forums like the UN. 
Public shaming of Saudi human rights violations is extremely rare. The following section 
seeks to determine how, and if, US and Chinese policies toward human rights differ in 
the GCC.  
US Reactions to the Arab Spring 
January 2011 brought about a series of revolutions known as the Arab Spring, 
fundamentally changing both the regimes and the political dynamics across the Middle 
East. The uprisings prompted unease and fear from leaders in the Arabian Gulf. Longtime 
rulers watched, as local protesters demanded the removal of President Hosni Mubarak 
and were surprised at US inaction to help stabilize the country. When Mubarak stepped 
down on February 11, 2011, Gulf leaders were stunned, particularly at the lack of US 
response to save its long time ally, Mubarak. Nervous the US would not intervene if 
instability ensued in their own countries; the GCC rulers moved to quickly clamp down 
on any domestic unrest inside their borders and announced that demonstrations and 
protests of any kind were illegal.157  
Less than a month later, Saudi Arabia sent the GCC’s joint military force, the 
Peninsula Shield Force (Dir Al-Jazeera) into neighboring Bahrain to assist the 
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government in responding to protesters. Created in 1982, the Peninsula Shield Force’s 
entry into Bahrain marked the first time a Gulf nation called on the united forces to 
“ensure the integrity of Bahrain’s territorial borders”158 and protect the ruling elites from 
the masses. White House spokesman Jay Carney “carefully avoided direct criticism of the 
Saudi-led entry of Gulf forces into Bahrain, telling reporters that, in the view of the 
White House, this is not an invasion of the a country.” Carney added,  
“We’re calling on the Saudis, the other members of the GCC countries, as well as 
the Bahraini government, to show restraint. And we believe that political dialogue 
is the way to address the unrest that has occurred in the region in Bahrain and in 
other countries, and not to, in any way, suppress it.”159 
During the Arab Spring, the US instinct was to stick with its allies but that policy quickly 
evaporated as the US realized intervention would complicate the democratically inspired 
uprisings. The Obama administration’s decision not to intervene resulted in a loss of US 
credibility in Saudi Arabia’s eyes.  
Bahrain, with the assistance of Saudi and GCC military forces, blocked the 
protests by firing nonlethal weapons at protesters, including teargas and bird pellets. The 
US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute assessed the Arab Spring in Bahrain 
and concluded, “Pressuring the Saudis on this issue would probably not have a decisive 
result unless the United States is prepared to provoke a full-scale crisis with Saudi 
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Arabia.”160 The US thus hedged its bets and allowed the GCC force to quell the domestic 
unrest rather than instigate a direct conflict with either regime. The State Department 
released a statement justifying its decision, noting, “There are limits to how far 
Washington can criticize Bahrain, as a sovereign country, for inviting Gulf Cooperation 
Council troops in.”161 There was no additional evidence of the US government critiquing 
Saudi involvement in Bahrain or suppressing domestic uprisings during the Arab Spring.  
Country Reports on Saudi Arabia   
In addition to public statements about current events, the US government 
publishes annual Country Reports to document improvements or regression in efforts to 
protect human rights in each nation. Country reports for each year are supposed to reflect 
changes in the political environment and include new evidence about human rights 
violations as well as efforts to improve infrastructure, facilities, or governmental 
approaches to human rights.  
The US Country Reports for Saudi Arabia in 2011, 2012, 2013 were nearly 
identical despite Saudi involvement in suppressing protests in its Eastern province and in 
Bahrain. The reports cited the same pressing human rights concerns including,  
“citizens’ lack of the right and legal means to change their government; pervasive 
restrictions on universal rights such as freedom of expression, including on the 
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internet, and freedom of assembly, association, movement, and religion; and a 
lack of equal rights for women, children, and noncitizen workers.”162 
   
Saudi Arabia’s reports became lengthier yet less detailed with each year, 
repeating the same information from previous years. Saudi Arabia’s 2012 report copied 
and pasted evidence from previous human rights cases, reaching as far back as 2007. The 
report inserted old human rights cases into the 2012 report, reusing human rights 
violations in past years to lengthen the 2012 report. In one example, the 2011 Country 
Report for Saudi Arabia stated, “In August the Royal Diwan forwarded the case of 
Rizana Nafeek…[who] had no legal representation at her initial trial in 2007.”163 The 
2012 report recorded, “In August 2011, the Royal Diwan forwarded the case of Rizana 
Nafeek…”164 The report used thirty-nine events from 2011 to give examples of human 
rights abuses in the 2012 report.165 In the following year, the 2013 report included 
statistics that were four years outdated: “Juveniles constitute less than 1 percent of 
detainees, according to a 2009 estimate.”166 The 2013 report cited thirty-six references to 
cases in 2012 and twenty-four examples from 2011.167  
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Moreover, the reports for Saudi Arabia focused on how the Saudi legal 
institutions functioned as opposed to detailing current Saudi Arabia human rights 
violations. For example, the 2012 report detailed how “the king, interior minister, defense 
minister, and national guard commander all have responsibility in law and practice for 
law enforcement and maintenance of order.”168  The reports detailed the intricacies of 
Sharia law, the responsibilities of particular agencies, and rationalizations behind Saudi 
practices. The reports included human rights violations sparsely throughout. The Country 
Report of 2013 included one important exception, where the report acknowledged, “there 
were some reports of human rights abuses by security forces.”169 Still, the reports of 
Saudi Arabia lacked the definitive accusation the State Department used in the Bahrain 
Country Reports, where State reported, “Security forces committed human rights 
abuses.”170  
In sum, the thirty to forty page Country Reports historicized past human rights 
violations instead of reporting on new violations.  Either information was not available 
for the State Department to use or the US included overly detailed information and past 
human rights violations to bolster the annual reports for Saudi Arabia. The reports 
revealed the US hesitancy to publicly critique human rights violations in Saudi Arabia.  
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US Advocacy for Individual Human Rights Cases  
The third measure of changing diplomatic relations involves utilizing major 
international institutions, like the United Nations to publicly air grievances of other 
nations. Unlike the Country Reports for Saudi Arabia, the US government officially 
expressed dissatisfaction with specific Saudi policies and handling of human rights 
situations at the United Nations, albeit rarely.  
During the 2013 session of the UN Human Rights Council, the US was among 13 
countries that scrutinized Saudi human rights. The US delegation directly “criticized 
Saudi Arabia's enforcement of male guardianship for women,”171 highlighting the 
importance of gender equality in the domestic realm. In the same session, US diplomat 
Valerie Ullrich commented on Saudi human rights conditions, expressing concern that 
“Saudi citizens have been harassed, targeted, detained, and punished for simply 
expressing their beliefs, opinions and views.”172 In September 2014, US Ambassador to 
the UNHRC, Keith Harper, commented on the state of international civil societies and 
noted, “in other parts of the world, bloggers and writers are facing increasingly lengthy 
prison terms for expressing their opinions, including Raef Badawi in Saudi Arabia.”173 
Harper’s comment represented the entirety of the US governmental response to Badawi’s 
imprisonment. These three instances reveal the rare cases in which US officials publicly 
criticized Saudi Arabian human rights practices. Like the Country Reports, US advocacy 
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efforts for individual human rights abuses failed to adequately or wholly address each 
case in a manner consistent with the abuse.  
China and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia  
 The Chinese most often broadcast their foreign policy in forums like the United 
Nations and through state press, though are notoriously vague when describing their 
foreign policy stances. In 2005, former Secretary General of the Communist Party of 
China, Hu Jintao, announced China’s pursuance of a “harmonious world” (in addition to 
China’s previous declaration of a “harmonious society”).174 While notably nebulous, 
analysts pointed to China’s “harmonious world” as an example of its devotion to stability 
and non-interference in its foreign and domestic policies, most visible in China’s 
treatment of human rights. China claims to supports non-interference in domestic affairs 
and human rights abroad and expects reciprocal actions from others. Chinese statements 
about the Middle East confirm the prioritization of stability and economic partnerships 
over any kind of human rights promotion or protection. China only publicly reacts to 
domestic problems in other countries when stability threatens Chinese investments or 
broader political stability. Instead of commenting on human rights violations, Chinese 
diplomats made an effort to praise positive “developments” and discount human rights 
violations or areas of concern.  
January 2006 marked the first time a Saudi head of State visited China, an 
important diplomatic gesture the King used to signal growing ties between the two 
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nations. In March 2013, the new Saudi Crown Prince Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud 
visited Beijing and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss the budding bilateral 
relationship between the two nations. President Xi warmly welcomed the Saudi 
delegation, “hailing Saudi Arabia as China's good friend, brother and partner in the 
Middle East and Gulf region.”175 Xi added that the two sides should “support each other 
on issues concerning each other's core interests, expressing China's support to Saudi 
Arabia for choosing a development path that suits its own conditions.”176 Like Saudi 
Arabia, China recognizes the fundamental right of the government to respond to domestic 
human rights issues in ways it deems appropriate. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
expressed, “that as a good friend of Arab states, China supports them in properly 
resolving issues in the region with their own efforts and concentrating on development. It 
is in the common interest of Arab states.”177 Yi’s response once again underscored the 
Chinese tendency to support the principle of non-interference and prioritize economic 
development.  
Like the US, China utilizes official forums, like the United Nations to critique and 
praise developments in other countries. Chinese praise results in other countries 
reciprocally commending China’s progress and development. During the same 2013 
session of the UNHRC where the US questioned the Saudi policy of male guardians for 
women, China joined the majority of nations in applauding Saudi efforts to improve 
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women’s rights. (Only 13 nations called women’s rights in Saudi Arabia into question.) 
In addition, China declared, “We appreciate efforts made [in Saudi Arabia] to protect the 
rights of children and to have dialogues of religious tolerance."178 In a reciprocal fashion 
Saudi Arabia praised China’s notable “progress” in developing “ethnic minority regions 
[like Tibet] at the political, cultural and educational levels.”179 Similarly, in the 2014 
Universal Periodic Review report on Saudi Arabia, the Chinese government praised 
Saudi advances and commended  “Saudi Arabia’s efforts to promote economic, social 
and cultural rights [and] welcomed efforts to promote dialogue and tolerance among 
religious groups.”180 Most recently, in a 2014 bilateral Saudi-Chinese visit to Beijing, 
President Xi “expressed China’s support to Saudi Arabia for choosing a development 
path that suits its own conditions.”181 
In conclusion, both the US and the Chinese governments were nearly silent when 
discussing human rights policies in Saudi Arabia. The US did not directly critique Saudi 
troops entering Bahrain to quell the uprising during the Arab Spring, nor did the US 
denounce Saudi Arabia’s handling of domestic affairs despite its numerous systemic 
human rights violations. The United States remained practically silent on Saudi Arabia’s 
human rights record, except when the United States evaluated Saudi Arabia in the UN 
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and pointed to several areas of concern, and in one case directly criticized human rights 
violations. Strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia clearly outweighs human rights 
monitoring, as the lack of current information in the Country Reports and the lack of 
public acknowledgement of violations shows.  
Since the Arab Spring, the US-Saudi relationship remained unaffected by the 
infrequent US reactions to human rights violations in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, 
Chinese praise of Saudi progress seemed to strengthen diplomatic relations. China 
announced support for the Saudis at strategic moments when strains were evident in the 
US-Saudi relationship. Perhaps surprisingly, the Chinese and US responses were similar 
toward Saudi Arabia: both said little in response to Saudi human rights violations.  
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP  
  
Over the last seven decades, Saudi Arabia and the United States maintained 
robust diplomatic, economic, and strategic ties, prompting many to refer to the US-Saudi 
relationship as “special.”182 Beginning in the 1930s and 40s, burgeoning oil ties initiated 
closer security cooperation, at the time critical to securing access to and safety of US 
energy assets in the Gulf. By 1944, Saudi Arabia agreed to the opening of a US military 
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base in Dhahran, located in eastern Saudi Arabia,183 spurring years of security 
cooperation and familiarity between military forces. Opening the base in Dhahran 
facilitated communication between political leaders, laying the foundation for shared 
security concerns between the US and Saudi Arabia. In the last several decades, mutual 
security concerns include the Gulf War, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Israel, the Iraq 
War, the War in Afghanistan, the growth of extremism, the protection of energy 
infrastructure and shipping routes, as well as the maintenance of regional stability.  In 
recent years, fundamentally different approaches to the extensive list of mutual security 
interests often complicated security cooperation between the two nations. 
While historically the Saudi’s have been stalwart partners in issues of defense, the 
attacks of September 11 severely strained US-Saudi strategic relations. Fifteen of the 
nineteen 9/11 attackers hailed from Saudi Arabia, placing severe pressure on the US 
government to react publicly and demand retributive justice. In the Gulf, the conservative 
government of Saudi Arabia “could not risk inciting public outrage by cracking down on 
donations to these [terrorist] groups” nor could they risk the Saudi public believing Saudi 
leaders had cowed to US pressure.184 Tensions remained high between the governments, 
as neither Saudi nor American leaders had faith in each other’s efforts to protect its ally’s 
national interest.  It was not until the attacks of 2003 and 2004 in Riyadh when Saudi 
terrorists targeted nine Americans and dozens of other foreigners that the Saudi 
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government officially allied with the US against Islamic extremism. Swift action taken by 
the Saudi government reestablished some trust between the two nations, and security 
cooperation began with renewed vigor. Since the attacks, the US-Saudi alliance in the 
War on Terror has been “based on the shared interest in undermining a common foe,”185 
violent extremism. Though defense cooperation occurred mostly behind the scenes due to 
public distrust, security cooperation matured in the barracks, bases, and embassies around 
the Middle East in the years after the Riyadh attacks.  
The United States’ military, in particular, has had a special relationship with 
Saudi Arabia’s armed forces for decades. In addition to an active history of arms sales, 
the United States Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia has operated intermittently 
in Saudi Arabia “under a special bilateral agreement… funded by Saudi [arms] purchases 
since the 1950s.”186 USMTM works with Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of the Interior to 
“protect key infrastructure locations” and provide critical defense support within Saudi 
Arabia’s borders.187  
Additionally, the United States allocates small amounts of International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) funds to Saudi Arabia annually. IMET programs expose 
Saudi military personnel to US training protocols and facilitate “the development of 
important professional and personal relationships, which have proven to provide US 
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access and influence in a critical sector of society.”188 The level of funding the United 
States provides to Saudi Arabia is quite low compared to neighboring states. The low 
funding “permits the Saudi government to purchase military training in the United States 
at a considerably lower cost than is charged in countries that are not eligible for military, 
education and training funds.”189 For Saudi Arabia, IMET funding guarantees arms sales 
and military training, providing both a consistent and trusted customer for the US defense 
industry. The graph below highlights the significant difference in IMET funding for 
comparatively small Bahrain to Saudi Arabia between 2009 and 2013. 
Figure 5. US IMET Funding for Saudi Arabia and Bahrain between 2009-2013  
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Perhaps counterintuitive, Saudi Arabia’s IMET funding shows the strength of the 
US-Saudi defense relationship; the US disperses funds to a country that does not have a 
pressing need for IMET training. Rather, the small amount of US funding allows the 
Saudis to access cheaper military training and arms from the United States FMS program. 
This funding benefits the US because it “increases US sales abroad and builds new levels 
of interoperability with potential coalition government partners, which enhances the 
effectiveness of US military operations.”190 Levels of IMET assistance remained 
relatively stable; there have been no major changes in funding for this program in the last 
six years. IMET sales are but one indication of a mutually beneficial security relationship 
between the US and Saudi Arabia.  
Over time, the two governments also bolstered their strategic relationship through 
defense sales. US defense sales helped expand Saudi Arabia’s offensive and defensive 
military capabilities, simultaneously facilitating the US goal of strengthening the Saudi 
military to balance the rising power of Iran. For instance, the US provided military 
funding to “upgrade regional militaries that might be called upon to counter Iran in any 
future crisis.” The US approach to Saudi Arabia prioritizes its security relationship, 
highlighting Saudi Arabia’s critical role “as something of a counterweight to Iran,” and 
its “important role in containing Iranian influence in Iraq as US troops downsize their 
presence and prepare to leave.”
191  
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In 2010 the US and Saudi Arabia “signed a massive $30 billion sale of 84 F-15 
fighter jets to Saudi Arabia” in addition to advanced missiles, “capable of being launched 
in friendly territory and penetrating with great accuracy far behind an opponent’s 
borders.”
192 The United States has a vested interest in bolstering the military capabilities 
in the Gulf, particularly because the US also relies heavily on Gulf cooperation in 
fighting extremist factions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Syria.  
In addition to IMET training and defense sales, the United States works with 
Saudi intelligence and defense agencies to bolster security within the Kingdom. Al-Qaeda 
has worked consistently to undermine both US and Saudi security, aspiring to extinguish 
the Saudi monarchy and the US ‘empire.’ Working from a common goal (cooperating to 
incapacitate Al Qaeda forces) ultimately strengthened the two nations’ defense 
relationship. In 2008, The US and Saudi defense agencies provided each other with 
advisors to enhance domestic security against terrorist threats in the hopes of protecting 
key infrastructure and public spaces. Christopher Blanchard, analyst at the Congressional 
Research Service highlighted the agreement and noted that,  
“The US-Saudi counterterrorism and internal security cooperation has expanded 
since 2008, when a bilateral technical cooperation agreement was signed 
establishing a US-interagency critical infrastructure protection advisory mission 
to the kingdom… The Office of the Program Manager-Ministry of Interior (OPM-
MOI) is a Saudi- funded, US-staffed senior advisory mission that provides 
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embedded US advisors to key industrial, energy, maritime, and cyber security 
offices within the Saudi government.”193  
The integration of security advisors enhances essential communication between the two 
nations and builds trust among security forces. The US and Saudi Arabia assist one other 
in counterterrorism efforts, recognizing the serious threat that terrorism poses to both 
nations. A State Department spokesman praised US-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation; 
telling a Saudi journalist in Washington…“Saudi Arabia has been a key counterterrorism 
partner and a country that we work with very closely and effectively on counterterrorism 
issues.”194 In 2014, the White House declared,  
“US and Saudi defense forces enjoy outstanding partnerships and regularly 
participate in joint exercises to advance shared interests in Gulf security.  The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest US FMS customer, with active and open 
cases valued at approximately $97 billion, as Saudi forces build capabilities 
across the full spectrum of regional challenges.”195  
US strategic interests became intertwined with its commercial interests after the Cold 
War, when US government defense purchases dropped from previous levels. The defense 
industry needed new buyers and found important clients in the Middle East. This fusion 
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between US commercial and strategic policies led to a fusion of US strategic, economic, 
and diplomatic interests in Saudi Arabia. 
The Congressional Research Service published all pending US defense sales to 
Saudi Arabia between 2010-2014, including missile sales, engineering services, patrol 
boats, and air defense systems, to name a few. (See Table 1 on the following page) This 
list details the government sales between the United States and Saudi Arabia over the last 
four years, highlighting the income that defense sales bring to the US: upwards of ninety 
billion dollars since 2010 alone. Saudi Arabia’s defense purchases in the last four years 
demonstrate its heavy reliance on US military technology and training to maintain 
domestic and regional security. The deals listed below reveal only the last four years of 
defense sales, which have shown no sign of abating. Saudi Arabia continues to be the 
most important client for the US defense industry, exemplified by the “extraordinary” 
arms agreement with Saudi Arabia, represent[ing] by far, the largest share of US 
agreements in the world in 2011. Deals with Saudi Arabia include “multiple 
agreements…to provide 84 new F-15SA fighter aircraft, the upgrading of 70 of the 
existing Saudi F-15S fleet, and a variety of associated weapons, ammunition, missiles, 
and long-term logistics support for more than $29 billion.196  
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Table 1. Major US Defense Sales to Saudi Arabia, FY 2010-2014 
 
It is no accident that the Saudi Arabian government purchases a majority of their arms 
from the US, as the US defense industry captures “31% of the global arms market,” 
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followed by Russia, and quite recently, China rose into the position of the third largest 
seller of defense articles, surpassing Germany.
197 Though the Chinese rank of third 
largest arms exporter is significantly less than the US, capturing only 5% of sales, its rise 
in rank indicates growing Chinese dedication to competing in the defense industry.
198 The 
chart below, from the CRS paper on Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 
highlights the consistently important US-Saudi defense sales relationship compared to 
arms sales from other nations capable of producing advanced weapons.  
Political contexts also affected the strength of the US-Saudi defense relationship. 
Between 2004-2007 Saudi Arabia purchased more than triple the amount of arms from 
major West European powers (Britain, Germany, France) than they did from the US, 
coinciding with a period of distrust between the US-Saudi Arabia after 9/11. In the early 
2000s, mounting domestic pressure from the US and Saudi publics complicated the 
strategic relationship. It was only after US-Saudi cooperation after the Riyadh attacks in 
2004 that the defense relationship began to improve. It took time, however, to rebuild 
trust and diffuse public anger directed at Washington and Riyadh. As US-Saudi 
cooperation recovered from its 9/11 nadir, purchases soared between 2008-2011, with US 
arms deals more than nine times greater than purchases from major West European 
producers.  
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Figure 6. Arms Transfer Agreements by Buyer, Country, and Source 
 
This is particularly significant because the shale boom occurred during the same 
period, when the global financial crisis hit and US oil imports from Saudi Arabia 
stagnated. The upward trajectory in US arms sales to Saudi Arabia continued when “in 
2014, Saudi Arabia replaced India as the largest importer of defense equipment 
worldwide and took the top spot as the number one [defense] trading partner for the 
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US.”
199
 Despite a significant decline of Saudi oil imports to the United States, the US 
government found a way to secure Saudi Arabian cooperation—ramping up its defense 
contracts. Similarly, Saudi Arabia continued to award US companies’ defense contracts, 
awarding over $45 billion in defense deals to US companies like Lockheed Martin and 
Raytheon, as opposed to selling to British, French, or Chinese contractors. Without oil as 
a binding force, Saudi Arabia and the US continued to link their economies and interests 
to one another through defense sales.  
Cracks began to appear, however, in the once unshakable US-Saudi defense 
relationship. Kenneth Pollack, Middle East analyst at Brookings’ Saban Center for 
Middle East Policy noted, “the Saudis in particular are increasingly uncomfortable with 
the Obama administration’s approach, and we’re beginning to see the Saudis take a 
stronger role in their security,” including strengthening ties with China.”
200
 Displeased by 
what the Saudis saw as Obama’s refusal to act decisively in Syria, in a rare move, Prince 
Turki al Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief critiqued President Obama by stating,  
“We’ve seen several red lines put forward by the President, which went along and 
became pinkish as time grew, and eventually ended up completely white…When 
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that kind of assurance comes from a leader of a country like the United States, we 
expect him to stand by it.”201 
Public criticism of US policy sent a strong signal to the Obama administration, 
underscoring Saudi frustration with what they saw as indecisiveness and inconsistency in 
the region. In addition, the Saudis increasingly worried about the US negotiations with 
Iran. The Saudis feared that a US deal would provide Iran with increasing opportunities 
to push its weight around in the Middle East, challenging Saudi prominence. Most 
importantly, the Saudis feared that the US and Iran would reach an agreement that could 
sacrifice Saudi security by allowing Iran to continue to enrich uranium. Heightened 
tensions persisted between the two nations and began to impact military relationships 
when in January 2015 Newsweek reported,  
“Saudi authorities used to grant the US military aircraft near-blanket permission 
to pass through Saudi territory on their way to East Asia. Now, says one US 
official who spoke…on the condition of anonymity, they periodically withdraw 
permission to remind us it’s their airspace. This forces American planes to add 
hours and thousands of miles to their flights as they weave around the Arabian 
Peninsula.”
202
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Public censure by Saudi officials and government decisions intended to snub its 
American ally implied that while US defense sales are critical, they do not buy Saudi 
silence. The Saudis and the US base their relationship on numerous factors, including 
reactions to international events. After the US announced a deal with Iran and refused to 
intervene in Syria, military relations with the Saudis became increasingly strained.  
China, on the other hand, began selling arms to Saudi Arabia in the mid-eighties 
when “the Chinese supplied Saudi Arabia with controversial ballistic missile systems.”
203
 
Though there is little public documentation about Saudi defense purchase of Chinese 
materials, Rachel Bronson posited that Saudi Arabia began “diversifying weapons 
purchases away from the United States, similar to the kingdom’s diversification of its oil 
industry”
204 in 2003, when US-Saudi relations were at a nadir after the attacks of 
September 11. Rumors circulated of a 2003-2004 Chinese shipment of “ new DF-21 
ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia,”
205
 confirmed later by numerous sources and 
corroborated by the numbers in the Arms Transfer Agreement graph, pointing to $800 
million in weapons sales from China to Saudi Arabia.   
Chinese defense sales have not reached the level of US-Saudi defense cooperation 
yet, though the Chinese government announced its intention to expand its defense 
cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Chinese press announced President Xi Jinping’s decision 
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to “strengthen military cooperation with Saudi Arabia to jointly safeguard world and 
regional peace and stability.”
206 Chinese and Saudi political leaders reiterated similar 
intentions over the last two years, signaling greater attention to bilateral defense 
partnerships, and perhaps Chinese intent to extend their reach to the Gulf peninsula. In 
November 2014, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
Wang Ning met with the commander of the Saudi Arabian Army Eid bin Awad Al-
Shalawi where they discussed the mutual focus on improving the interoperability of 
Chinese and Saudi forces.
 207
 Deputy Chief of General Staff Ning  
“Stressed that military cooperation is an important cornerstone of the relations 
between the two countries. In recent years, the two militaries of China and Saudi 
Arabia have carried out frequent mutual visits, and the two sides have been 
constantly deepening the pragmatic cooperation in the fields of 
professional technologies and personnel training.”
208
 
It would be imprudent, however, to paint the US-Saudi defense relationship as 
broken. While cracks appeared in recent years, the foundation of the Saudi-US 
relationship remains secure in the short term.  
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“Saudi Arabia has close defense and security ties with the United States anchored 
by long-standing military training programs and supplemented by ongoing high-
value weapons sales and new critical infrastructure security cooperation and 
counterterrorism initiatives. These ties would be difficult and costly for either side 
to fully break or replace”
209 in the near future. 
While China may be a direct competitor to the US for economic and diplomatic 
relationships, it is not yet capable of providing the quality or quantity of arms or security 
that the United States provides to Saudi Arabia. This gap guarantees at least cordial 
security cooperation for the next few decades.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
209 Blanchard, Christopher. "Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations." Congressional Research 
Service RL33533 (2015): 14. Congressional Research Service. Web. 22 Apr. 2015.  
 83 
Bahrain 
A tiny island nation in the Arabian Gulf, Bahrain is an important strategic ally for 
the United States in the region. Geographically situated between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
Bahrain boasts the role of buffer between the two central powers of the Middle East. 
Reflective of its geographic and political placement, Bahrain is comprised of both Sunni 
and Shia populations and has experienced intense political tension between the two sects, 
particularly since the Arab Spring. Bahrain is a monarchy led by the royal, Sunni, Al 
Khalifa family, who is allied closely with Saudi Arabia and represents the minority 
population in Bahrain. 210 Bahrain and the US have maintained a close economic and 
strategic partnership, exemplified by Bahrain’s decision to host the US Navy’s Fifth 
Fleet.  
This case study is organized into three parts: the economic, diplomatic, and 
strategic relationships, focusing on the significant change in relations between the US, 
China and Bahrain. 
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP  
  
Unlike Saudi Arabia, the US and Bahrain never defined their economic 
relationship by oil and gas trade. Rather, the US and Bahrain prioritize a relationship 
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based primarily on security cooperation. The US and Bahrain also boast a robust 
economic relationship based on trade agreements and strong business ties. The following 
section will examine the economic relationship between Bahrain and the US as well as 
highlight the growing economic partnership between Bahrain and the Chinese.  
As the following graph demonstrates, US oil imports from Saudi Arabia remained 
consistently higher than Bahrain throughout the last two decades, though both countries 
peaked and declined during particular periods, consistent with price variations and 
fluctuations in the energy market. Before September 11, petroleum imports from Bahrain 
were nearly nonexistent for several years. After the attacks of September 11, both Saudi 
and Bahraini energy imports to the US declined though US imports of both Saudi and 
Bahraini petroleum picked up during the US invasion of Iraq.  
By 2009, however, Bahrain exports to the US began declining once again, spurred 
by the global financial crisis while Saudi exports to the US remained relatively stable 
though declined slightly. The period between 2008 and 2009 also coincided with the US 
shale boom, when US producers began drilling large quantities of shale oil, the effects of 
which became evident in 2012. As the global financial crisis hit and shale exploration 
soared, US imports from Saudi Arabia stagnated, while Bahraini imports began a steep 
decline. By 2012, when US shale producers began to significantly increase production 
imports from Saudi Arabia also began to drop dramatically, while Bahraini imports fell 
so low that they became almost negligible, back to pre-9/11 levels. Three months in late 
2013 and early 2014 demonstrate the one notable exception: huge peaks in oil exports to 
the US. For Bahrain, the dramatic increase represented a historic level of US imports in 
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February 2014, exporting 1.12 million bpd to the US. Saudi Arabia also peaked to 2.5 
million bpd. Overall, the quantity of imports from Bahrain do not compare to those from 
Saudi Arabia, though do account for a piece of the US-Bahrain trade relationship.  
Figure 7. US Crude Oil and Petroleum Imports from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The center of the US-Bahrain economic partnership is the Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA). In 2006, the US extended a FTA to Bahrain, the first Gulf nation with which the 
US offered such an agreement. To date, Bahrain and Oman are the only two GCC 
countries with FTA agreements with the United States. According to the Office of the 
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United States Trade Representative (USTR), the FTA with Bahrain “promotes the policy 
of advancing economic reforms and liberalization in the Middle East,”211 in addition to 
supporting “Bahrain’s economic and political reforms and enhanc[ing] commercial 
relations with an economic leader in the Arabian Gulf.”212 The FTA offers US investors 
an advantage in investing in the country.213 The FTA also encourages diversification of 
the trade relationship between the US and Bahrain, particularly because “the United 
States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain.”214   
The majority of US imports from Bahrain include products like fertilizer, 
aluminum, clothing, and financial services.215 A 2015 Congressional Research report 
noted, “Without the ample oil or gas resources of its neighbors, Bahrain has diversified 
its economy by emphasizing banking and financial services,” in addition to the export 
products listed above.216 The US also has made an effort to invest in infrastructure in 
Bahrain, including a contract signed in 2011 in which Bahrain’s “Ministry of Housing 
awarded a $57 million contract to American dredging company Great Lakes Dredge and 
Dock Co. for a land reclamation project” to build new housing units.217   
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The imports and exports between the US and Bahrain have ebbed and flowed for 
years, though have increased overall fairly consistently since 1998. The relative amounts 
are quite low particularly in comparison to trade volumes with other regional partners. 
The FTA agreement highlights the uneven trade relationship with Bahrain and the US. 
Bahrain needs the US as an economic partner. The United States is the fourth largest 
destination for Bahraini exports globally, capturing 6.2% of all exports.218 Tanzania, 
India, and South Korea are the first, second and third largest export partners for Bahrain, 
accounting for nearly 30% of exports.219  
China ranks 13th, with 2.8% of all exports heading to Beijing.220 Bahrain imports 
the most products from China (16%), followed by Japan (11%) and the United States 
(8.5%), respectively.221 It is clear that for Bahrain the United States is an important 
supplier and consumer. For the United States, however, Bahrain’s importance as a trade 
partner is significantly lower. Since 2000, US exports to Bahrain accounted for .05% of 
all US exports on average. Approximately .03% of all US imports originated from 
Bahrain.  
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Figure 8. US-Bahrain Import/Export Patterns between 1999-2013  
 
While the US-Bahrain economic relationship is important, it is not particularly 
robust compared to other economic partners. Economic development between Chinese 
and Bahraini businessmen and politicians, however, is growing substantially.  In 2011, 
“China became the largest importer to Bahrain, with non-oil imports totaling more than 
$1 billion.”222 Exports to China and imports from China contributed substantial revenue 
to the government of Bahrain and laid the foundation for additional investments and trade 
agreements between the two nations.  
In 2013, “22% of all global investment by Chinese companies was directed 
towards the Gulf region and Bahrain, [whom the Chinese consider to be] the gateway to 
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this US $1.6 trillion market.”223 To signal the growing importance of its Chinese partner, 
the government of Bahrain recently began to allow Chinese nationals to apply for 
Bahraini visas on arrival, facilitating more frequent business interactions between the two 
nations,224 effectively reducing barriers to bilateral and trade visits. This development is 
particularly notable, as the Saudi government still requires a Saudi company to sponsor 
Chinese businessmen to apply for a visa to enter the country to do business.  
The Bahrainis began seriously pursuing an economic relationship with China in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s to diversify the economy and find additional regional trade 
partners. Chinese companies began heavily investing in Bahrain in the mid 2000s. In 
particular,  
“Huawei Technologies Co Ltd, one of China’s major telecommunication 
companies, moved its Middle East headquarters from Dubai to Manama in 
2009…[because] Bahrain offered the most favorable business environment in the 
Gulf, highlighting its attractive policies for foreign direct investment. This also 
led to 18 Chinese commercial agencies, including the Bank of China, 
opening operations in Bahrain.”225  
To facilitate further economic growth between the two nations, the two governments 
founded the Bahrain-China Joint Investment Forum (BCJIF) in 2010, “to enhance 
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financial cooperation in finance, real-estate and banking.”226 Economic partnerships 
began snowballing, and in 2013, Bahrain announced the beginning of an official 
partnership agreement “between Aba Hussain Company for fiber glass production…with 
Chinese company CPIC, which is one of the largest fiberglass manufacturers in the 
world”227 in addition to a memorandum signed between “Diyar Al Muharraq and 
Chinamex on behalf of Dragon City Project and…Bahrain telecommunications Company 
Bateclo and Huawei,”228 one of China’s largest communications companies. In an effort 
to continue building partnerships, in October 2014, China and Bahrain signed five 
memorandums of understanding (MoUs) and a letter of intent on an investment trip to 
Guangzhou, China. Plans included formal links between the Economic Development 
Board (EDB) of Bahrain and the Guangdong Chamber of Commerce, the Bahrain 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Guangdong Chamber of Commerce, 
agreements with a Chinese Interior Design firm, and agreements with Chinamex and 
Dongguan Elections Products Association to “promote Dragon City Bahrain and attract 
Chinese tenets.”229 Commenting on these meetings, Kamal Bin Ahmed, Chief Executive 
of the EDB declared, “There is no doubt that this visit to China has emphasized the 
importance of our trade relationship and the need to build on what we already have in 
place. This trip produced thirteen different agreements with various Chinese companies 
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and trade entities.230 Chinese investment continued to gather speed when the government 
of China announced the funding of several investment projects in Bahrain, including the 
construction of 40,000 residential units and additional retail spaces.231   
In January 2015, Chinese delegates arrived in Bahrain to discuss cooperation and 
investment with Bahrain’s national oil company Bapco.232 The company has not released 
the outcome of the meetings, though it is clear that both nations focused on reaching 
energy deals, exemplified by previous meetings in December 2014 in which “high level 
officials from the China National Energy Administration (NEA) as well as leading 
companies from the oil, gas and petrochemicals sector”233 took place throughout China. 
While unclear what discussions took place, Bahrain and China have met on numerous 
occasions to discuss energy cooperation, most likely in relation to Bahrain’s oil and gas 
refineries and rising levels of Chinese production. The Chinese may tap Bahrain’s deep 
knowledge of refining Saudi oil to apply to new Chinese refineries designed to process 
Saudi crude. In the future, cooperation between China and Bahrain on refining is likely.  
In conclusion, the US-Bahrain economic relationship reveals relatively little about 
the significance of the US-Bahrain relationship. For the US, Bahrain’s trade with the US 
is less meaningful than its defensive geostrategic position and military cooperation. The 
Free Trade Agreement between the two nations does demonstrate the dedication both the 
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US and Bahrain gives to building closer economic ties though should be considered in 
context. Growing bilateral trade between China and Bahrain, coupled with Chinese 
investments in Manama, reveal the extent to which China intends to capture Bahrain’s 
markets and establish critical trade ties. China’s strategy of investing heavily in Bahrain 
continues to match Bahrain’s persistent efforts to land Chinese investments and expand 
trade relations. These actions suggest that Bahrain intends to diversify its economy 
through diversifying its trade partners. The more China invests in Bahrain, the more clout 
Chinese businessmen and political figures will develop with Bahraini governmental 
figures, who are intent on expanding Bahrain’s economy and importance on the world 
stage.  
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP   
 
In 2011, like much of the Middle East, Bahrain experienced its own internal 
uprising when the majority Shia population poured into the streets and demanded reforms 
from the Sunni government. The protests resulted in severe clashes between the military 
and protesters. The government of Bahrain, along with military assistance from the 
GCC’s Peninsula Shield Forces, quickly crushed the rebellion by violently dispersing 
crowds, firing those who participated in protests, and arresting hundreds of organizers 
and sympathizers.234 At least eighty protesters died in the clashes.235 American officials 
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demanded a cessation of violence while the government of Bahrain maintained that the 
protests were internal matters that should not be subject to external pressures. The 
government’s violent reaction to the protests caused significant diplomatic tension 
between the US and Bahrain.  
This section focuses on the state of diplomatic relationships between the US and 
Bahrain and the US and China, concentrating on the period during and after the Arab 
Spring, between 2011-2014 to assess changes in the type or frequency of diplomatic 
engagement. 
US Reactions to the Arab Spring 
About a month after Lotus revolution erupted in Egypt, Bahrain experienced its 
own revolution on February 4, 2011. Protesters gathered in Pearl Square, demanded a 
change in leadership and greater representation for Bahraini Shias. The armed forces of 
Bahrain forcibly dispersed protesters over the course of the month, resulting in dozens of 
deaths. GCC troops entered Bahrain to quell the uprising on March 14, 2011 and 
effectively ended the revolution in Bahrain though unrest persisted.  
In Washington, White House officials reported that President Obama called 
Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa in both February and April to relay that 
“the United States, as a long-standing partner of Bahrain, believes that Bahrain's stability 
depends upon respect for the universal human rights of the people of Bahrain.”236 
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President Obama urged King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa to show restraint against peaceful 
protesters and hold violent protesters accountable.237 
After unsuccessful attempts at reaching a diplomatic resolution, the US took a 
firm stance against Bahrain’s violent repression of the Bahraini protests in the summer of 
2011 by placing Bahrain “on its list of human rights violators to be scrutinized by the UN 
Human Rights Council.”238  The list of violators also included China, Cuba, Iran, North 
Korea and Syria, a list Bahrain was reticent to join. At the United Nations, US 
Ambassador to the UNHRC Eileen Donohoe reacted to the situation in Bahrain and 
explained, “the United States is deeply concerned about violent repression of the 
fundamental freedoms of association, expression, religion and speech of their citizens.”239 
The same week, US Assistant Secretary of State for DRL Michael Posner, praised 
“positive developments in Bahrain” and pointed to “the release of detainees, the 
restoration of scholarships and reinstatement of workers.”240 The Bahraini government 
did not respond positively to its new position on the list of human rights violators and 
continued to suppress the uprisings while pointing to contradictory US statements of 
approval and censure. The lack of clarity in the US posture strained diplomatic relations.  
Nearly eight months after the revolution began, after a series of failed diplomatic 
gestures and Bahrain’s perpetuation of violent repression, in October 2011, the US chose 
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to freeze Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Bahrain to prevent the government from 
acquiring new military weapons to use against its citizens.241 The White House 
announced its reasoning by stating, “We have made the decision not to release additional 
items to Bahrain mindful of the fact that there are a number of serious unresolved human 
rights issues that the government of Bahrain must address.”242 As of July 2014, the US 
government maintained its three year long hold on selling “TOW missiles and 
Humvees— the type of equipment that had previously been used in crackdowns on 
protesters.”243 The US eventually relaxed its freeze on most other weapons. The FMS 
hold, though, remains a point of contention between Bahraini and US leaders.  
Between the outbreak of protests in February 2011 and December 2013, the US 
Mission in Geneva delivered no less than nine official statements that specifically 
expressed ‘concern’ over the human rights situation in Bahrain.  A 2013 joint statement 
praised Bahrain’s notable progress though expressed unease over the  
“Ongoing violation of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association 
and the repression of demonstrations…[and] the continued harassment and 
imprisonment of persons exercising their rights to freedom of opinion and 
expression, including of human rights defenders.”244  
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Three years later in June 2014, the Kuwait News Agency reported that US Vice 
President Biden called King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa of Bahrain to discuss ongoing 
bilateral issues.245 The two leaders discussed “ongoing efforts at reform and dialogue 
within Bahrain,”246 where Biden "encouraged the Government of Bahrain, opposition 
parties, and all segments of Bahraini society to reach agreement on meaningful reforms 
and a path forward that addresses the legitimate aspirations of all Bahrainis."247 The US 
statement was consistent with past US rhetoric that encouraged peaceful and democratic 
dialogue as key to halting the ongoing conflict. The US publicly and repeatedly expressed 
concern over the actions taken by the government of Bahrain. Public criticism escalated 
bilateral tensions and resulted in stalled progress in dialogues between the US and 
Bahrain.  
Country Reports on Bahrain  
Every year, the US releases its annual Country Reports on Bahrain. Governmental 
officials, NGOs, and members of the opposition parties comment on these reports in the 
press and in Parliament, as they often spark critical responses.  
At the end of February 2011, less than a month after the Arab Spring spread to 
Manama, the State Department released its Country Report on Human Rights in Bahrain. 
The Country Report listed “the most egregious human rights problems” as 
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 “The inability of citizens to change their government [peacefully]; the dismissal 
and expulsion of workers and students for engaging in political activities; the 
arbitrary arrest and detention of thousands, including medical personnel, human 
rights activists, and political figures, sometimes leading to their torture and/or 
death in detention; and lack of due process.”248  
The 2011 report examined the period of unrest that occurred between February and April 
in great detail, including the types of torture used on the victims, the locations where 
unrest occurred, organizations responsible for detention and torture, as well as listed all 
claims of abuse reported. The reports in 2012 and 2013 also detailed human rights 
violations, but focused on events that occurred each year.  
The substantive content of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 reports differed slightly from 
year to year. The 2011 report pointed to numerous instances of “alleged acts” of both 
protesters and police officers. The words “alleged,” “reported,” and “accused” were 
common throughout the report. The 2011 report highlighted US resistance to condemning 
specific actors, as State Department officials continued to seek verifiable information.249 
The Country Report for 2011 did note, however, the “culture of impunity” that “pervaded 
the security apparatus,” and accused the government of Bahrain of failing to hold its 
officers responsible for atrocities committed.250 In the 2011 Country Report, the US 
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government censured the government of Bahrain’s actions while continuing to urge 
domestic reform and call for systemic change.  
The publishing of the 2012 Country Report allowed State Department political 
officers additional time to verify whether the Bahraini government followed through on 
promised reforms, convened fair trials, tortured prisoners, or held officers accountable for 
the mistreatment of protesters or prisoners during or after the 2011 uprisings. The 2012 
report acknowledged that security forces “showed greater restraint in comparison with its 
conduct in response to protests in 2011,” and dually noted the violent nature of the 
protesters who “used improvised explosive devices, Molotov cocktails, and other 
improvised weapons.”251 In contrast to the 2011 report, the 2012 report exposed US 
frustration with the government of Bahrain’s lack of accountability. While the report 
included some use of “alleged and reported” incidents, the majority of the report used 
direct language.252 For example, the 2012 report stated, “Security forces committed 
human rights abuses.”253 The report cited detailed instances of human rights abuses, in 
addition to human rights abuses the State Department had not yet verified. The clear 
change in tone from a neutral, non-accusatory approach to one that directly assigned 
blame indicated the United States’ mounting pressure on the government of Bahrain and 
its rising expectations for improvements in resolving human rights cases.   
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Even stronger, the Country Report for 2013 linked the government of Bahrain to 
human rights abuses committed by the security forces. Instead of noting “security forces 
committed human rights abuses,” like the 2012 report, the 2013 report added, “authorities 
maintained effective control over the security forces. Security forces committed human 
rights abuses.”254 2013 marked the first year the State Department directly blamed the 
government for the breakdown in human rights under the security forces. This report also 
cited instances of human rights violations more frequently than it cited in the previous 
two years. The 2013 report used language to highlight the continuity of human rights 
abuses like “the government maintained the revocation of citizenship,” “discrimination 
continued against the Shia population,” and recognized a “sustained period of unrest.”255  
The notion of continuity in the 2013 report followed the trajectory of increasing tension 
between the US and Bahraini governments over human rights issues. Over three years, 
the State Department’s criticisms increased in both number and scope, emphasizing the 
strained diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Country reports are not yet 
available for 2014. 
US Advocacy for Individual Human Rights Cases  
In 2014, the United States government began commenting on individual cases in 
Bahrain, a diplomatic action the US had refrained from doing in previous years. In the 
past, the US expressed grievances privately, published them in Country Reports, or 
officially discussed these criticisms the United Nations. In July 2014, the government of 
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Bahrain publicly declared Assistant Secretary of DRL Tom Malinowski unwelcome in 
Bahrain and demanded his immediate departure from the country. Though Secretary of 
State Kerry called the Foreign Ministry to complain, the Bahraini government insisted on 
his departure.256 On August 21, the government of Bahrain again denied access to 
prominent US officials, including US Representative Jim McGovern and director at 
Human Rights First Brian Dooley. In a press release issued by McGovern’s office, 
McGovern noted, “As became evident with the recent expulsion of… Tom Malinowski, 
the Bahraini government seeks full control over the narrative about their country and 
does not tolerate any voices of dissent.”257 Overt US criticism of Bahrain’s policies 
increased following Tom Malinowski’s forced departure.  
The US did not officially comment on individual human rights cases in Bahrain in 
the international media until 2014. In September, the United States advocated for the 
release of prominent human rights activist, Nabeel Rajab, leader of Bahrain’s opposition 
party, Al Wefaq. Bahraini authorities charged Rajab with insulting the government via 
Twitter. The State Department publicly advocated for his release and announced that the 
US government does  
“Not agree with the prosecution of individuals for crimes of peaceful political 
expression and again urge the government of Bahrain to drop the charges and 
release Mr. Rajab. Obviously we believe he has the right to freedom of 
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expression—it doesn’t mean we agree with everything he tweeted but certainly 
agree he has the right to do it.” 258  
US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Powers echoed similar sentiments when she 
tweeted “human rights advocate @nabeelrajab still jailed in Bahrain. His supposed 
crime? Insulting a public institution on twitter. Must be released.”259 In the forum of the 
UN, Samantha Powers also urged Bahrain to release Mr. Rajab,260 while Keith Harper, 
the US Ambassador to the UNHRC, also tweeted in response to Rajab’s arrest, “no one 
should be jailed for a tweet.”261 A month later, Department of State spokesperson Jen 
Psaki directly responded to the arrest of human rights activist Zainab al Khawaja, who 
faced charging for tearing up a picture of the king. Psaki stated,  
“We’ve seen reports of Ms. Khawaja’s arrest and detention. We’re following the 
case closely, and as in any countries, we call on…Bahrain to ensure equal 
treatment under the law and to advance justice in a fair way. We again urge the 
Government of Bahrain to take steps to build confidence across Bahraini society 
and to create an environment conducive to dialogue.”262  
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The US reaction to Mr. Rajab and Ms. Khwaja’s cases indicated a new willingness of the 
United States government to comment in the press on individual human rights cases in 
Bahrain, likely a result of mounting US frustration with the government of Bahrain’s lack 
of commitment to reform and continual arrests of opposition leaders. The statements 
from US officials reinforce the mounting disapproval of human rights violations, as seen 
in the Country Reports and the increasingly informal criticisms posted on Twitter.  
The government of Bahrain was less than enthusiastic with the new US approach 
to publicly critiquing the government of Bahrain in both official forums and on social 
media. Perhaps surprisingly, the Bahraini public, particularly the Shia populations, also 
expressed disapproval of US policy. Opposition members noted the US tendency to name 
human rights violations but pointed to the lack of US action to resolve these issues. 
Former President of the Center for Human Rights in Bahrain and leading Shia activist, 
Maryam al Khawaja publicly stated, “The United States has done nothing. I don’t 
anticipate the US…changing their international policies anytime soon due to the 
geopolitical interests they have with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and other countries in the 
region.”263 The Bahraini public echoed Ms. Khawaja’s sentiment, criticizing what they 
saw as both the action and inaction of the US government.  
Despite the sensitive nature of newspaper publishing in the Gulf, local reactions 
to US policies in the Gulf were widespread. Statements published in the press reflected a 
general discontent with US statements, reports, and presence in the region. Harsh 
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criticism of the US by the locals suggested deep-rooted frustration with what they view as 
US intervention in domestic affairs. Bahrainis reacted strongly to the Country Reports 
published during and after the Arab Spring, citing grievances with the facts and 
challenging the report’s neutrality. Popular Bahraini newspaper Al Watan reported 
“Parliament affirmed that this report is tantamount to open interference in our domestic 
affairs, which does not serve the relations between the kingdom of Bahrain and the 
US.”264 The 2013 report also elicited responses from twitter, echoing frustration with the 
US. One tweet from an opposition member stated, “#US Hypocrisy Praised #Saudi 
Invasion &Killing protesters in #Bahrain Mr @State_DRL Do U Remember us?”265 
The release of the 2013 Country Report, which condemned tacit governmental approval 
of human rights violations, spurred Bahraini lawmakers to pass an amendment that would 
limit US ability to “interfere with domestic affairs.”266 This proposal, passed into law, 
highlighted “the sensitivity in relations between the strategic allies, particularly in the 
wake of Bahrain's displeasure about a US State Department report which was critical of 
the Gulf Arab country's government.”267 An unnamed Bahraini politician noted, "The 
people were very upset. The public in Bahrain were very upset ... [that] the report wasn't 
even."268 The Bahraini government rejected the country report for “lacking neutrality and 
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objectivity.”269 The Minister of the Interior denounced the US report for its “racially 
charged language.”270 Numerous newspapers concluded that US allegations of excessive 
force were “utterly baseless.”271 Isa Al Kooheji, a prominent Member of Parliament 
challenged the US report, questioning, "What are these human rights violations that 
security forces are allegedly committing?"272 Bahraini political commentator Sarah 
Ashoor noted, “It is evident that this year's report is far from a neutral publication and the 
accounts reported in it vary widely from factually incorrect to events in some instances 
that have never occurred.”273 Even prominent human rights leader, Nabeel Rajab, an 
opposition leader that the US intervened to assist in his human rights trial declared, 
"Democracy isn't only for those countries the United States has a problem with,”274 and 
noted the need for an even application of US criticism on human rights abuses in Bahrain 
and in the region.   
When the government of Bahrain expelled US Assistant Secretary Tom 
Malinowski in 2014, columnists and politicians in Bahrain and around the Gulf praised 
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Bahrain’s decision as “courageous.”275 This move by the Bahraini government was 
unprecedented, as no Gulf nation had publicly kicked out a US representative in  
decades. Prominent Gulf newspapers denounced US interference and demanded further 
action—some called for the removal of the US Ambassador.276 The public response to the 
Bahraini decision to expel Malinowski was overwhelmingly positive. Local organizations 
like Al Asala Islamic Society claimed that the move was "historic and brave."277 Gulf 
citizens viewed Bahrain’s decision as a step in the right direction: separating itself from 
American influence.278  
China and Human Rights in Bahrain  
While local populations challenged the role of US influence in the Gulf, Gulf 
citizens saw China as a viable political alternative. China offered Bahrain a model of 
what the Bahrainis viewed as economic development free of political constraints and 
criticism of human rights. Chinese diplomatic policies in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
reflected the same sentiments China expressed elsewhere in the Middle East: China 
encourages support for national sovereignty, economic development, and non-
interference. China does not directly comment on specific human rights violations, but 
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rather praises general improvements in human rights conditions. Chinese foreign policies 
are essentially a mirror of China’s domestic policies. China promotes abroad what it 
promotes at home, and therefore structures its foreign policy to support its economic 
development in both the short and long term.  
During periods of diplomatic tension between the US and Bahrain, China 
indirectly criticized US interference in Gulf countries’ domestic affairs. In January 2014 
while Bahrain continued to grapple with American “interference” in domestic affairs, 
Beijing announced its support of “GCC efforts to protect their sovereignty and regional 
stability.”279 In July 2014, Chinese newspaper People’s Daily reported on Bahrain’s 
forced departure of Tom Malinowski though cited no censure or praise of the 
government’s decision. 280 Four months later, in November 2014, Chairman of the 
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Yu 
Zhengsheng, met with King Hamad in Bahrain. In response to the recent controversies 
between the United States and Bahrain, Chairman Zhengsheng reemphasized “his 
country's support for Bahrain's efforts to preserve its sovereignty, underscoring China's 
support for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.”281  
Determined to distinguish itself politically from previous powerful actors in the 
region (the United States and Britain), China has released statements supporting 
Bahrain’s sovereignty at opportune moments to contrast the American emphasis on the 
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human rights agenda. In 2012, in a rare interview with Bahraini newspaper Al-Wasat, the 
Chinese Ambassador  to Bahrain spoke candidly about human rights and democracy. The 
Ambassador explained, “human rights is a good thing… but the concept of human rights 
differs from one country to the next. It’s also necessary to differentiate between one stage 
[of democracy] to another…and necessary to apply human rights gradually.”282 Where 
the US promoted human rights reforms, or encouraged dialogue between the opposition 
party and the government, China underscored its devotion to principles of non-
interference and highlighted its flourishing economic partnership with Bahrain. This 
distinction better aligned China with GCC countries’ approaches to diplomatic 
partnerships.  
Little information is available on Chinese commentary on specific human rights 
issues in Bahrain, a reflection of the Chinese propensity to speak in broad principles, not 
particular cases. In January 2014, China’s tendency to encourage broad principles was 
evident when Bahrain’s Minister of State for Human Rights Dr. Salah bin Ali 
Abdulrahman welcomed the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China, Li Chen. 
Ambassador Chen noted the “opportunity for mutual cooperation and coordination 
between the two friendly countries in the area of human rights in order to reap the benefit 
to all.”283 What exactly human rights ‘coordination’ efforts between China and Bahrain 
looks like remains unclear. During the 25th anniversary of bilateral relations in April 
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2014, Chinese Ambassador to Bahrain Mr. Li Xin defined “mutual political trust and 
cooperation … and compatibility of views regarding issues of human rights and workers' 
rights”284 as the heart of the Chinese-Bahraini bilateral relationship. Both nations 
emphasized that the primary duty of the state is stability, above all else.  
To date, China has not made any direct reference to human rights violations in the 
Middle East. For the Chinese, human rights are a means to strengthen bilateral relations, 
not weaken them. China sees no benefit in commenting on human rights violations, 
unless they threaten regional stability or Chinese interests. Similarly, Bahrain has not 
commented on the Uighur uprisings in China because,  
“To some Arab regimes, the bloody images of riot police clashing with Uighur 
protesters in Xinjiang's capital…were strikingly familiar…how could they 
criticize the Chinese government? They are in the same boat.”285  
Former Chinese Ambassador to the UAE Hua Liming noted, “GCC countries are very 
important for China in preventing and cracking down on the three evil forces of 
separatism, extremism, and terrorism.”286 For the Gulf and Chinese governments, 
“cracking down” on these three “forces” trumps human rights violations. Each 
government respects and acknowledges the existential threat that supporting revolution 
abroad may incur at home. Compared with the US approach of criticizing human rights 
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abuses in Bahrain, the Chinese diplomatic strategy of encouragement received 
significantly more support from both the Bahraini public and the government.  
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP  
  
Strategic cooperation between the United States and Bahrain has been the 
hallmark of their bilateral relationship for decades, providing the two nations with 
mutually beneficial security arrangements. For the United States, having basing 
privileges for the 5th Fleet in Bahrain allows the US nearly unfettered access to the 
Persian Gulf and a strategic foothold in an unstable region. For Bahrain, cooperating with 
the US military brings in significant revenue, investments, and American companies, 
though more importantly, provides a security guarantee for the leaders of Bahrain against 
undue Iranian influence. This section will outline the strategic relationship between the 
United States and Bahrain, as well as examine Chinese-Bahraini strategic ties.  
The US military has maintained a presence in Bahrain since “1949 [when] the 
Pentagon established a small, permanent Middle East naval force (MIDEASTFOR)”287 in 
the bay of Manama. Years of military cooperation followed, though challenges in 
relations have occurred periodically throughout the last seven decades, including during 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the United States aided Israel against invading Arab 
armies. During this period of tension, Bahrain’s military requested that the United States 
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remove its forces to the Gulf waters, where the navy stayed for a month until the Amir 
reconsidered the removal.288 Since the Gulf War, however, the two militaries raised their 
level of cooperation after Bahrain “acted as a major naval base that hosted 20,000 US 
troops and served as a hub for air operations against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm.”289 
To formalize strengthened military ties after the Gulf War, the US and Bahrain signed a 
Defense Cooperation Agreement,290 signaling their intention to strengthen military 
cooperation by “granting US forces access to Bahraini facilities and ensuring the right to 
pre-position material for future crises.”291 
Following up on that pledge, after the Gulf War, the government of Bahrain 
approved the opening of a new US Central Command (CENTCOM) Naval Military base 
(NAVCENT) in Manama in 1995. The rent amounted to a “$6.7 million annual lease 
payment,” in addition to “military aid -- ranging from $6 million in 2006 to $18 million 
in 2010 -- and security pledges.” Foreign Policy reported that the NAVCENT base 
“contributes about $150 million annually to Bahrain's economy, or about one percent of 
GDP. Last May, US officials announced a plan to double the size of the base by 2015, 
with the intent of spending an additional $518 million,”292 a significant financial 
investment in the small country. Economic incentives for defense cooperation certainly 
                                                
288 Joyce, Miriam. "Independence to Yom Kippur War." Bahrain from the Twentieth Century to the Arab 
Spring. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 54-55. Print.  
289 Cooley, Alexander, and Daniel Nexon. "Bahrain's Base Politics." Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, 5 
Apr. 2011. Web. 14 Apr. 2015.  
290 Ibid.  
291 "Military in Manama: Bahrain." Global Security. Global Security. Web. 14 Apr. 2015.  
292 Cooley, Alexander, and Daniel Nexon. "Bahrain's Base Politics." Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, 5 
Apr. 2011. Web. 14 Apr. 2015.  
 111 
did not hurt US interests in the country, though the US military stationed in Bahrain 
brings in more than dollars. The US bases brings with it security assistance, military 
training, weapons, and counterterrorism cooperation.  
During the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the War on Terrorism, Manama acted as a 
forward operating base for US military missions, providing the critical functions of 
refueling, posturing, and basing.  Bahrain’s assistance to the US during military 
operations solidified its place as a critical partner for the US in the Gulf. After the attacks 
of September 11 and President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, Bahrain aided the United 
States in its efforts against terrorists in Afghanistan in 2001 and Sadaam Hussein in 2003, 
demonstrating that the geostrategic location of “the Fifth Fleet continue[d] to play a 
crucial role in America’s strategic posture in the Middle East.”293 
To date, Manama hosts the headquarters for the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which is 
“assigned to ensure the free flow of oil and other resources though the Persian Gulf and 
surrounding waterways,”294 in addition to “patrol[ing] the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the 
western part of the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf, ensuring that sea-lanes remain 
open, protecting the flow of oil, conducting anti-piracy operations, and acting as a check 
against Iran's regional influence.”295 Commander Richard McDaniel of the US Navy 
opined, “the most important US strategic base in the heart of the Middle East lies in the 
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small island country of Bahrain,”296 a country whose security and military cooperation 
largely defines US strategy in the Middle East.  
Two major elements define the strong US-Bahraini defense relationship-- defense 
sales and intelligence cooperation. As the US Chamber of Commerce concluded, defense 
sales are critical components of US national security because “US military systems and 
technology are the weapons of choice throughout the world, providing both US strategic 
and tactical advantage to US war fighters and first-class interoperable systems to our 
friends and allies.”297 Since 2000 “the US has provided upwards of $1.4 billion in defense 
sales to Bahrain,”298 most of which the government of Bahrain used to purchase military 
weapons from the United States. A major part of the $1.4 billion US appropriations went 
to training Bahraini Defense Forces (BDF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET), Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA).   
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Figure 9. US Defense Assistance to Bahrain, by Program  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between FY2009 and FY2016, Foreign Military Financing accounted for the 
largest majority of the budget. Significant funding levels also went to other categories 
including counterterrorism training, demining and nonproliferation, military training, and 
technological transfers. Though these programs received smaller financial contributions 
from the US government, the funding sponsored critical programs. For example, the large 
spike in 2009 under ‘Section 1206’ refers to US funding for a Biometric Collection 
Program in Bahrain, most likely used to capture fingerprints or use facial recognition 
software to bolster the country’s growing counterintelligence program by systematically 
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tracking those entering and leaving the country.299 The implementation of this technology 
also assists US efforts to flag terrorist movements in the country and to restrict visas to 
those with criminal records.  
The US also provided support for IMET training, used to train Bahrain’s Defense 
Forces to operate alongside US forces. Not only does IMET training improve the quality 
of the Bahraini military processes, but also it trains local officers to operate with US 
personnel, equipment, and procedures, facilitating joint operations between the two 
militaries. To date, Bahrain is the “only Arab nation to have led one of the coalition task 
forces that patrol the Gulf,”300 a testament to US trust and cooperation through IMET 
training with Bahrain’s forces. Unlike Saudi Arabia’s small IMET appropriations, the 
government of Bahrain receives a significant amount of annual funding to train its 
military forces.  
In addition, programs dedicated to nonproliferation, demining and 
counterterrorism also received modest funding. The demining exercises, often led by the 
US, are critical to ensure the security of the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, often littered 
with mines that pose a threat to both oil tankers and military vessels that pass through the 
narrow channel. During an International Mine Countermeasures Exercise hosted in 
Bahrain in 2012 “US Vice Admiral John W. Miller hailed Bahrain's cooperation and 
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support to ensure the success of the anti-mine military exercise.”301 Ambassador 
Designate to Bahrain William Roebuck noted in his address to Congress on Sept. 14, 
2014; “We work closely with the Bahraini Defense Forces, in particular their Navy and 
Air Force, on a range of fronts, including counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations.”302 
Financing for counterterrorism programs also went toward tracking terrorist 
financing around the world. Within these counterterrorism operations,  
“Bahrain is…a valuable partner in disrupting illicit finance flows to terrorist 
organizations… [highlighted by the fact that] Bahrain hosts the Secretariat for the 
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a regional body that 
coordinates efforts against terrorist finance.”303  
US leadership continuously praised Bahrain’s cooperation in counterterrorism measures 
despite breaks in diplomatic relationships. King Hamad bin-Isa Al Khalifa also praised 
the depth of the US-Bahrain relations in January 2014 in a meeting with CENTCOM 
General Lloyd Austin III where he “hailed [the] deep rooted historic relations and 
steadily-growing cooperation between the two allies and partners, affirming Bahrain’s 
keenness on bolstering multi-level relations, particularly military cooperation.”304As both 
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countries consistently face the threat of extremist violence, a close security relationship 
remains a priority.  
However, appropriations for these programs, while strategically important, paled 
in comparison to the large portion of the budget dedicated to Foreign Military Financing.  
The US provides FMF “to Bahrain to help it maintain US-origin weapons, to enhance 
inter-operability with US forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to support and 
upgrade the avionics of its F-16 combat aircraft, and to improve counterterrorism 
capabilities.”305 The graph below highlights the large financial commitment to Bahrain 
vis-à-vis Foreign Military Financing, which the US provides to Bahrain to purchase US 
defense products and services. Similar in nature, Foreign Military Sales transfer funds to 
Bahrain to purchase defense products, but unlike FMF appropriations, Bahrain can use 
part of the FMS funds to purchase weapons through private defense corporations.  
The allocation of FMS funds to Bahrain increased steadily since 2009, though 
experienced a sharp drop after the uprising in Bahrain in 2011. “Until the recent 
revolutions in the Middle East, Bahrain's relative stability and loyalty to the United States 
provided comfort to Pentagon officials,”306 though US officials lost confidence in the 
stability of the regime after witnessing mass protests and the government using deadly 
force against the protesters. As a result, the US military suspended some weapons sales to 
Bahrain, limiting weapons that the regime could use against protesters, including 
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Humvees, tear gas, rifles, and ammunition.307  
Figure 10. US Defense Assistance to Bahrain, Percentage of Budget   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As of January 2015, the US government continued to hold the sales of the 
weapons to the Ministry of the Interior, though the US continued to supply “equipment 
that is suited to Bahrain’s external defense capabilities.”308 The graph below depicts the 
significant drop-off of defense and arms sales to Bahrain between FY2011 and FY2013. 
This period is particularly important, as the US-Bahrain diplomatic relationship also took 
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a downward spiral after the uprisings of the Arab Spring. While experts often claim the 
US-Bahrain relationship is unbreakable, the uprisings in Bahrain in 2011 suggest 
otherwise; when the US publicly condemned the government’s use of force against 
protesters, the stalwart defense relationship also absorbed some strain, evidenced through 
a $3 billion dollar reduction in defense assistance. Bahraini and US military leaders also 
felt the repercussions of the financial hold, as cooperation between the military leaders 
became a political issue, broadcasted in newspapers across the Arab and Western worlds.  
Figure 11. US Arms Sales to Bahrain: 2007-2013  
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As recently as December 2014, during the annual Manama Dialogue sponsored  
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Bahrain’s Crown Prince met with 
Marillyn A Hewson, the president of Lockheed Martin Corporation where the Prince 
“stressed the importance of working together with international defense and security 
companies on enhancing Bahrain's military capabilities.”309 The Gulf press that covered 
the conference praised Bahrain’s efforts to combat terrorism, highlighting cooperation 
with Canada, Singapore, Egypt, and the GCC. The lack of reference to the United States 
was notable. After three years of increasing pressure form the US to enact human rights 
reforms, the government of Bahrain used the press to subtly remind the United States that 
it does not wish to openly associate itself with the US government.  
Though the US-Bahrain security relationship has a solid foundation built on 
decades of cooperation, the uprisings of 2011 called into question the strength of that 
relationship. Kenneth Katzman, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at CRS reported, 
“US officials say that US- Bahrain differences over Bahrain’s handling of the unrest has 
caused Bahraini officers to become slightly less forthcoming with in-kind support to the 
US military presence in Bahrain.”310 As Katzman goes on to suggest, the tension likely 
emanates from “ resentment over the US withholding of some arms sales to Bahrain or 
retaliation for US criticism of the government’s handling of the unrest.”311 Regardless of 
the cause, the strain the Arab Spring put on the US-Bahrain defense relationship is 
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worrying, particularly as the Gulf region continues to experience uprisings and 
instability.  
 Defense cooperation between Bahrain and China, however, remains limited due to 
Bahrain’s strong ties with the United States. To date, China has not sold arms to Bahrain, 
though on occasion Chinese military officials visited Bahrain by invitation of the 
Bahraini Defense Forces.  In November 2008, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie 
met with Bahrain’s Crown Prince and Prime Minister to discuss boosting military ties. 
The Chinese Defense Minister announced, “China is willing to deepen pragmatic 
cooperation in various fields and push ahead its military relations with Bahrain.”312 
Bahrain’s Crown Prince echoed similar statements by stating, “Bahrain is committed to 
building strategic cooperative relations with China which would benefit the people of the 
two countries…expressing hopes to further bilateral state and military relations with joint 
efforts of both sides.”313 While bilateral military relations have not yet blossomed into a 
strong partnership, the invitation extended by Bahrain’s military to China suggests 
willingness on the part of the Bahrainis to explore a military partnership in the near 
future.  
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PART III: CONCLUSION 
 
The GCC pivot to Asia has accelerated with each passing year, highlighted 
through increasing trade volumes, diplomatic engagement, and strategic cooperation with 
China.  
As GCC-China trade ties grew in both quantity and quality, US diplomatic 
tensions with some GCC nations flared. Though increasing trade with China did not 
cause the tension with the US, China deftly used rising tensions to exploit the GCC’s 
frustration with what they saw as misguided and contradictory US human rights policies.  
After the Arab Spring spread to Manama in 2011, instead of finding points of 
commonality, like China ventured to do through expanding economic relations, the US 
attempted to fix what it saw as underlying issues by encouraging democratic reforms and 
using FMS appropriations as sticks.  Meanwhile, the US remained silent on human rights 
concerns in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia did not receive nearly the same amount of attention to 
human rights from the US mainly because the US prioritized the security relationship 
over human rights reform. In Bahrain, however, US attention to human rights grew 
exponentially after the Pearl Revolution broke out in 2011. Convinced that US pressure 
on the regime could alleviate human rights abuses and restore stability, the US continued 
mounting pressure on Bahrain, publicly shaming Bahrain’s human rights problems and 
freezing FMS sales. Unexpectedly, however, Bahrain began to push back and expelled a 
senior diplomat who was visiting Manama to record human rights practices. The US 
response to human rights violations in Bahrain resulted in tension between the US and its 
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Gulf partners, with regional GCC allies frustrated at what they viewed as US intervention 
in domestic affairs.  Protesters in the streets of Manama exclaimed, “I know there are 
clashes between your interests and your values. Where is your democracy values? Where 
is it? We want to see these values [sic]!”314 US rhetoric on Bahrain’s human rights abuses 
was significant compared to its reaction to violations in neighboring Saudi Arabia.   
While US ties with Gulf nations have not reached a breaking point, greater 
political distance between the US, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia made room for the Chinese 
in the Gulf. The ineffective US human rights strategy in the Middle East after the Arab 
Spring opened the door for the Chinese to promote a model of economic development 
free from political obligations. Though the Chinese style of diplomatic engagement 
comes with its own kind of strings attached, Gulf populations view China as an 
alternative to the US, who they believe has meddled too often in the affairs of Gulf 
States. The United States will likely never be able to offer a political relationship with no 
strings attached because its national values are often integrated with its foreign policies. 
Even in Saudi Arabia, the US has redlines and at times has spoken out against severe 
human rights abuse.  
Nevertheless, US strategic cooperation with both nations has remained relatively 
strong throughout the turmoil, with the exception of rising tensions caused by US 
withdrawal of FMS funds. In part, this is due to a lack of alternative strategic and military 
partners for the GCC nations. The US is the Gulf’s most consistent, high quality military 
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partner and arms supplier. The US protection of the Gulf from undue Iranian influence 
and regional threats like ISIS remains something only the US can offer.  
With potential changes in the Iranian-US relationship on the horizon, however, 
US promises of protecting Saudi Arabia and its regional allies may shift the status quo 
sooner than expected. Saudi Arabia’s reaction to a US-Iranian deal remains unclear; 
though it is likely that deep Saudi unease could result in Saudi Arabia reaching out to 
new strategic partners, as it believes US loyalty to Saudi Arabia’s regional dominance is 
wavering.  
Though the GCC pivot to Asia began as a series of economic linkages in the early 
2000s, its acceleration in recent years has changed the calculus of US military and 
diplomatic influence in a region historically critical to US interests.  The US must find a 
way of remaining true to its values while balancing important strategic and military 
relationships with key partners in the Middle East to safeguard its interests in the long 
run.  
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP  
 In the mid 2000s, the West, once the source of rising demand for energy began to 
see a decline in consumption. The center of gravity shifted to Asia, where quickly 
developing nations set the bar for global demand. The changes that resulted from shifting 
consumer/producer relationships in the global energy market resulted in the 
reconfiguration of economic relationships around the world, spurring similar shifts in 
political and security dynamics among nations.  
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The US announcement of a US pivot to Asia in 2012 arrived late compared to its 
global counterparts. The GCC pivot to Asia began several years earlier as a result of 
changing trade patterns and the GCC pursuit of alternative consumers for their energy, 
officially announced by King Abdullah’s “Look East” policy in 2005. This pivot only 
accelerated in 2008 and 2009 when the global economic downturn and the US shale 
boom reinforced the GCC’s need to diversify its economic partnerships.  
The relatively new partnerships between China and members of the GCC are 
significant because historically the Gulf was a vital economic partner for the United 
States, who received an important share of its oil from the Gulf nations. As US oil 
production during the “shale boom” increased, US oil and gas trade with Saudi Arabia on 
average declined. The Shale Revolution reinforced the reality that the US-Saudi 
relationship was not, and had not been defined by oil for some time.  
Though energy trade declined, the United States was determined to preserve 
economic links with its formerly critical trade partner. The diminishing US reliance on 
energy as a critical input for both the US and Saudi economies prompted a reevaluation 
of fiscal commitments between the two nations. Thus, the United States attempted to 
forge a new economic partnership, based on its commitment to investment, exchanges, 
strong trade relations, and defense sales. As the once strong US-Saudi oil relationship 
weakened, the two nations increased bilateral investments and significantly increased 
defense sales.  
The US-Bahrain relationship has a different flavor: it never revolved around oil 
trade. Their partnership was comprised of a strong defense and diplomatic relationship. 
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Trade between the US and Bahrain helped facilitate business relationships and 
meaningful exchange, though it never defined the bilateral relationship. Changes in oil 
trade patterns also had a negligible effect on the relationship. Over the last seven decades, 
the level of investment, exchange, and business between the two nations remained 
substantial, despite fluctuations in diplomatic relations. The economic partnership 
between Bahrain and the United States was an added benefit to the strong defense 
relationship though never an integral component. If the United States was not the 
“protector” of Bahrain, the economic relationship would be negligible, or at least 
equivalent to trade relations with partners with similar trade volumes.   
What did have a significant impact on the economic relationship was China’s 
attention to the Gulf markets. It is telling that over the last two decades, trade between 
China and the GCC,  
“has improved continuously… According to the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, from 2000 to 2009, bilateral trade volume between China and the GCC 
states increased with an average annual growth of 57.8%. The volume of China’s 
exports to the GCC states was rising from $3.68 billion to $31.25 billion; imports 
were increasing from $6.45 billion to $29.45 billion.”  
The massive expansion of trade volumes over the last decade emphasizes the great 
lengths China and the GCC countries are taking to encourage investment and business 
cooperation. China’s focus on the Gulf is also evident through its efforts to reach Arab 
audiences. The Chinese launch of a public relations campaign in the Arab world, 
including investing in training Arabic speakers in the government, promoting cultural 
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exchange, arts exhibitions, and translation services all contribute to China’s larger goal of 
building long term relations with its new GCC partners. For China,  
“to develop relations with the GCC states is an important part to enhance China’s 
international influence; while for the GCC states, to strengthen cooperation with 
China is a strategy to confront the pressure from America” 315 to reform domestic 
institutions and establish democratic frameworks.  
Chinese investment alone is not a threat to the United States. Economic 
development around the world is beneficial to both the recipient country and the United 
States. Chinese investments may even promote greater stability in the GCC nations by 
encouraging development and a stable economy. What is worrying, however, is the 
amount of political clout Chinese business leaders and politicians are beginning to hold in 
Bahrain and increasingly, in Saudi Arabia. China’s number one position as trade partner 
with Saudi Arabia, its rising rank with Bahrain, and China’s attempts to court the Arab 
public suggests that the Chinese model of economic development does not end at access 
to resources. The Chinese are buying their way into Gulf markets and establishing 
political and military relationships along the way. In the long-term, Chinese influence as 
number one trade partner could overshadow US economic interests and political leverage.   
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DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP  
From the diplomatic angle, the US and China approach human rights policy from 
two diametrically opposed perspectives: in most cases the US approaches human rights as 
integral to development and stable long-term partnerships while the Chinese view human 
rights as inherently disconnected from economic development and diplomacy.  The 
evidence shows, perhaps surprisingly, that US and Chinese policies regarding human 
rights in Saudi Arabia are quite similar (silent), though differ significantly in Bahrain.  
In Saudi Arabia, neither the US nor China openly discuss specific human rights 
issues. On the rare occasions when the US and China do raise such issues, they are 
officially addressed in the forum of the United Nations. US statements differed from 
Chinese statements in that they challenged Saudi policies, while the Chinese focused on 
praising Saudi progress. Neither approach seemed to directly affect Saudi bilateral 
relations, nor cause notable diplomatic tension. Between 2011-2014, the Saudi public was 
not reactive to US or Chinese policies, particularly when compared with the vocal 
protestations of US policy from Bahraini citizens. The government of Saudi Arabia 
effectively ignored US censure because the government assumed that strategic and 
military relationships would trump human rights disputes. Continued US silence on Saudi 
human rights abuses reinforced these assumptions.  
In Bahrain, local reactions to US policies reflected growing frustration with US 
policies. Both the Bahraini government and the public cared a great deal more about US 
critiques than their Saudi neighbors. The public reacted strongly to US Country Reports 
published on Bahrain, as well as to any perceived interference in the country. Local 
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politicians also responded more vociferously to US policies. Fervent anti-American 
rhetoric prompted prominent Bahrainis to call for closer alignment with China. While the 
Bahrainis campaigned for greater ties with China, they also urged the government to 
rebuke the US for its interference in domestic affairs, going so far as to request the 
removal of the US ambassador on several occasions.  
The level of US pressure on Bahrain, the most liberal and politically inclusive 
nation in the Gulf, is surprising. Perhaps the aggressive US stance originates from US 
failures regionally. The US needs ‘a win’ in the Middle East, a country where promises 
of democracy and liberal reform can come to fruition. US censure also may reflect higher 
expectations of Bahrain, after demonstrating the capability to institutionalize democratic 
policies. High expectations, though, resulted in significantly greater diplomatic pressure 
and soured relations, quite the opposite from the US intent to strengthen a diplomatic and 
potentially democratic ally in the region.  
China, on the other hand, frames its diplomatic cooperation with Bahrain in 
economic terms by praising economic cooperation in Bahrain and expanding business 
cooperation, investments, and cultural exchanges between the two countries. The Chinese 
government continues to subtly criticize US policies in the Gulf, mainly by touting 
Chinese policies of non-interference at opportune moments in the press. Comparatively, 
the US has been silent on Chinese behavior in the Gulf, as Chinese involvement in 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia thus far revolves around economic cooperation. Neither 
Bahrain nor Saudi Arabia has yet expressed negative sentiments regarding Chinese 
investment or presence in the region. The US, therefore, has little to refute. China found a 
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successful method to frame its influence as mutually beneficial to both populations: Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, and China all pursue similar strategies of economic development and 
stability. All three nations prioritize foreign policies that promote non-interference. The 
US has not yet found a way to reframe its influence as beneficial to the broader Gulf 
public.  
Reactions to US and Chinese statements from Bahraini and Saudi locals 
emphasize the Gulf tendency to view regional influence as a zero sum game. Much like 
the Saudis encouraged US entry in the Gulf to counter British influence in the forties, 
Bahraini rhetoric seems to intimate a similar desire. Bahrain hopes China may prove to 
be a counterweight for US influence in the region, particularly in light of recent disputes 
over human rights, military sales, and unsolicited interference in domestic affairs. Saudi 
Arabia remains undecided, though undoubtedly enjoys the competition over Saudi 
products and partnerships.  Saudi Arabia hesitates to choose sides because it remains 
strategically and economically linked to both nations.  
Influence in the Arabian Gulf does not need to be a zero sum game, in fact, it 
should not be. Bahrain’s attraction to China as a new partner in the region does not mean 
that US policies failed unequivocally. Rather, China presents a more politically attractive 
alternative to a region tired by overt US intervention. As Gulf publics view influence in 
their sphere as zero-sum game, it is essential that the US alters the Gulf perception and 
changes the rhetoric to reframe the dialogue away from rising China, failing US and 
increasingly toward a Gulf characterized by multilateral cooperation.  
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The US and Chinese approaches to human rights in the Gulf reveal an interesting 
trend. US leverage in the GCC is limited, even in a small state like Bahrain, a surprising 
fact given the strong ties the US had with Bahrain in the past. The tense US-Bahrain 
diplomatic relationship can be viewed as an inevitable result of waning US influence in 
the Middle East: the legacy of a decade of mismanaged policies in the Middle East and 
rising disdain for American interference. Once a stalwart ally of the US, the small nation 
of Bahrain pushed back against the United States for the first time in 2014 by expelling a 
senior diplomat. Though the Bahrainis finally allowed Malinowski to return, Bahrain’s 
defiance and refusal to assent to US demands reveals shifting power dynamics. Bahrain’s 
successful attempt at standing up to the United States did not cost them in the short or 
long term as the US took no retributive actions. This example highlights the US inability 
to exert unilateral influence over its once accommodating partner. In the case of human 
rights, Bahrain’s refusal to enact serious human rights reforms becomes less surprising 
with each passing year, particularly in light of the US insistence on arms sales freezes for 
Bahrain’s Defense Forces.  
In sum, the Chinese model of non-interference created a potential opportunity for 
the Chinese to move from a primarily transactional relationship to a politically 
constructive one. If Chinese influence grows and becomes a viable alternative to the 
American influence, US leverage and ability to unilaterally demand domestic change may 
decline. Where human rights issues are a source of conflict with the United States, they 
are a point of common interest and expediency with China. The Chinese government 
perceives its bilateral relationships with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as essential to 
 131 
maintaining stability and critical for deepening economic ties in the region. China expert 
Shannon Tiezzi explains, “a good relationship with Saudi Arabia would allow China not 
just to secure oil imports from Riyadh, but to create a partnership dedicated to 
“stabilizing” the region, ideally keeping all Middle Eastern oil flowing smoothly.”  
The US tendency to publicly shame Bahrain’s policies is contributing to analysts’ 
predictions of a Gulf with limited US influence. The US should not adopt the Chinese 
policy of non-interference, but rather develop a new approach to support human rights 
that would not exacerbate existing tensions. It is clear that when competing against the 
Chinese model of non-interference in the Gulf, the US approach is unsuccessful. The US 
must begin to shift its policies to retain its influence in a region critical to US national 
interests.  
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP  
US security appropriations to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are the foundation for 
both bilateral relationships. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted,  
“The selling and buying of weaponry is ‘to secure the peace…’ Military sales are 
among the key threads that run through the conventional narrative about the 
relationship’s logic and worth; namely, an exceptionally pragmatic search for 
security and stability.”316 
 It is indicative of the strength and the dependency of the US-Saudi relationship that in 
2013, Saudi Arabia officially became “the largest defense market for US weapons 
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makers, as the oil sheikdom increased its defense imports 54% from 2013 to 2014. This 
year is expected to be another strong year for Saudi imports… rising another 52% to $9.8 
billion.”317  
Though Bahrain spends less on defense than its powerful neighbor, the US 
remains dedicated to its defense relationship with the small island nation despite rising 
tensions. The US 5th fleet bases its operations in Bahrain, along with NAVCENT and 
MARCENT forward bases, critical to supplying and supporting US operations around the 
Middle East. Bahrain’s geography also allows the US and other regional allies to monitor 
Iran and patrol the Strait of Hormuz to keep oil and trade sea-lanes open. Basing 
privileges in Bahrain remain a high priority for the US defense establishment and will 
continue to be critical in the coming decades. As Commander Richard McDaniel noted in 
No Plan B,  
“To say that Bahrain holds immense strategic and operational value is an 
understatement. Functionally and geographically, the small island state serves as 
the strategic centerpiece for US maritime strategy, security, and stability in the 
Persian Gulf.”318  
The US cannot afford to allow its critical defense relationship to deteriorate in the next 
several years. In the long run, the US must either search for alternative strategic positions 
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from which to base US operations in the Middle East or work to ameliorate the existing 
tensions between the diplomatic and military communities in Bahrain.  
Though dissatisfaction with US policies may prompt Gulf locals to call for China 
as an alternative partner in the region, China is currently unable to provide the military 
and security partnerships needed to maintain stability. China is quickly building up its 
military, though cannot yet extend its military arm far past the South China Sea. “What 
seems most likely, says Daniel Wagner, is that China, Saudi Arabia and the US will 
practice a rather awkward triangular balance of power in the Persian Gulf, because Saudi 
Arabia is unwilling to completely abandon its American ally and China cannot yet fulfill 
the role of security partner.”319  
While the United States defense relationship with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is 
strong, it is not unbreakable. In the long-term, competitors like China may offer a serious 
alternative to US arms sales and defense cooperation in the region. It is clear that the 
Chinese “view foreign arms sales as an important market in which it wishes to compete, 
and has increased the promotion of its more advanced aircraft in an effort to secure 
contracts from developing countries.” The quality of Chinese arms is not able to currently 
match those produced in the US defense industry, but the Chinese will not remain far 
behind for long. Ni Lexiong, director of national defense policy research at Shanghai 
University estimates that “the speed of the People’s Liberation Army’s modernization has 
indeed exceeded western countries’ expectation…the gap is between 20 and 30 years, he 
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said. At the current pace, China may catch up with the US in 40 years, and may start to 
get ahead in 60 years.”320  
Chinese military growth parallels its economic and political development. A 
strengthened Chinese military will likely compete with the US for influence in 
particularly critical regions, like the Gulf, but this does not intimate an inevitable arms 
race or an escalation in conflict. A rising China does not present an existential threat to 
the United States. China and the United States can both exert influence, though the US 
will likely need to compromise on its less significant strategic interests.  
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What Does this Mean for the US?  
SHORT TERM  
In the short term, US strategic interests are not in immediate danger. Though US 
polices are increasingly unpopular in Gulf nations, the Saudi and Bahraini governments 
recognize the critical role the US plays in their defense. US arms sales and defense 
cooperation with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia remain critical elements of their national 
security. Particularly during an era of rising extremism, no other actor can offer the 
quality of arms, counterterrorism cooperation, and intelligence sharing that the US can 
provide. US military supremacy safeguards its role as protector for the Gulf in the short 
run.  
However, US censure of Bahrain’s human rights violations paired with its freeze 
on arms sales will continue to strain diplomatic relations. The Bahraini government does 
not appreciate the public nature of US criticism, nor do they welcome what they view as 
unbalanced attention to Bahraini human rights violations. The US stance on human rights 
violations after the Arab Spring undermined US interests in the long run and did little to 
stop human rights violations from occurring outright. The US took a middle approach, 
censuring human rights abuses, though turning its head when Saudi/GCC troops arrived 
to violently suppress the protests. The US selected particular human rights abuses to 
publicize, though ignored numerous others. This led to the primarily Shia opposition 
groups viewing US efforts to promote human rights as underwhelming and hypocritical. 
The ruling elites, however, viewed US interference as damaging, tainting Bahrain’s 
reputation internationally, and undermining stability at a critical period.   
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The US desire to remain a balanced actor in the conflict between the ruling Sunnis 
and the Shia opposition discredited the US in both their eyes. Instead of denouncing 
human rights abuses across the board, the US government choses the most important 
cases. Shia opposition members claim that instead of promoting democracy and human 
rights full force, the US limits its calls for democracy to politically opportune moments. 
The Bahraini public views these US policies as hypocritical and overly political. Current 
US human rights policies have become counterproductive and a source of tension from 
both segments of Bahrain’s population. In the short term this distrust is unlikely to 
significantly affect the working diplomatic relationship but may seriously impact the 
perceptions and loyalties of Bahrain’s next generation of leaders who will rise to power 
in the coming years.  
LONG TERM  
In the long term, if China’s economic and political growth continues on its 
upward trajectory, it is highly likely that the Chinese military will continue its military 
expansion and began to rival that of the US military. 321,322 In the past decade, China 
significantly increased its defense budget to strengthen its military, exemplified by the 
construction of a second Chinese aircraft carrier.323 In comparison, the US currently owns 
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ten aircraft carriers, the most of any nation.324 Admiral Robert Willard, former head of 
US Pacific Command (PACOM) stated that China “has exceeded most of our intelligence 
estimates of their military capability and capacity every year.”325  
As Chinese financial assets grow in the Gulf and the Chinese ship more oil 
through the Strait of Hormuz, China may increase its military presence in the region to 
defend its assets, potentially becoming a ‘protector’ of stability in the region. Currently, 
China free rides from US protection of the region, which includes 24-hour drone flights 
across the Strait of Hormuz every three days, manned P-3 surveillance, troop patrols and 
constant mine sweeps.326 To date, Chinese-led patrols of the Gulf have been rare because 
China does not have the capability to project its military force that far beyond Chinese 
waters. Also, the Chinese have little incentive to do so while the US foots the bill.  If 
China’s partnerships with the GCC nations continue on a similar trajectory however, 
China will have significantly more to lose from a potential closure of the Strait of 
Hormuz as Saudi Arabia is currently China’s primary supplier of energy. If Chinese 
assets in the Gulf become threatened in the coming decades, it is possible China will take 
action to defend its interests.  
Economically, the trajectory of growth between the GCC and China suggests a 
continued strengthening of diplomatic and economic relations in the coming years. China 
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has already eclipsed the US as Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner and shows similar 
trends across the other GCC nations. Regional dynamics and changing trade relations 
suggest a rebalance of influence in the long run. Unless the US makes significant changes 
to its economic and diplomatic policies in the Gulf, the US could find its political 
influence diluted in the long run.  
The US cannot afford to lose influence with the ruling monarchs as they secure 
access for US troops to bases across the Gulf as well as assist in military and intelligence 
efforts. US interests in the Gulf would be impacted significantly by losing access to 
basing privileges and cooperative intelligence gathering, critical for the US to continue 
fighting the War against Terrorism. The US heavily relies on Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, 
in addition to many other GCC partners for military support. For instance, Bahrain alone, 
 “Enables US and coalition maritime forces to maintain a watchful eye on Iran 
and readily provide a robust maritime response in the highly volatile Persian Gulf 
and Strait of Hormuz. Bahrain hosts Naval Support Activity Bahrain and is home 
to US Naval Forces Central Command, Fifth Fleet Headquarters, and over 5,000 
Sailors and Marines. [The] Fifth Fleet oversees and operates all United States and 
coalition maritime activity in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, 
the Red Sea, and much of the waters off eastern Africa.”  
Two scenarios should concern US policymakers in the long run. First, the US 
should worry if China develops a full-fledged military and arms sales program, capable 
of competing directly with US influence and defense products. While Chinese influence 
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is currently rising due its position as primary economic partner, this fact alone should not 
cause significant unease. If, however, China’s economic dominance is paired with 
competitive military forces, arms sales, and a Chinese willingness to act militarily far 
beyond its borders, the United States could face serious competition for regional 
influence.  
Second, policymakers should worry if there is a significant change in leadership 
in the Gulf: for instance, if disenfranchised citizens successfully overthrow one of the 
standing regimes. The historic US relations with the Gulf monarchies stretch back 
decades. If opposition parties whom the US has not favored seize power, the US would 
likely face significant hurdles in establishing cordial relationships with the new 
governments. As noted earlier, the current frustration of opposition parties with US 
policy would likely hamper US diplomatic efforts to cooperate with opposition-led 
governments, particularly in the initial transition phases. The US may be able to adapt to 
the regimes eventually, though it would be unlikely that the US would be the partner of 
choice due to the mistrust between opposition members and the US government. China 
would be a likely alternative for new leaders who yearn for a clean slate and a stung 
partner. China claims to offer economic development without political obligations, unlike 
the United States, who not only sets high standards on their allies but also comes with a 
long history of political disapproval in the region.  
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What Should the US Do?  
 
US policymakers need to reexamine the US approach to the Middle East not only 
so US policies can be more effective and serve the national interests, but also to 
guarantee a stable place for the US in the coming decades if China continues to rise. As 
Prince Turk Al Faisal, former Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US explained, “China is 
not necessarily a better friend than the United States but it is a less complicated 
friend.”327 This sentiment, now all too common among the regimes in the Gulf, reinforces 
the need for the United States to redefine its approach to its Gulf partners. The US 
approach to human rights in the Gulf is not working; a reality that China is exploiting to 
bolster relations with the GCC and provide a contrasting model of diplomatic 
engagement more appealing to Gulf leaders. It should be noted, however, that tense 
relations with GCC partners are not solely the product of ineffective US policies after the 
Arab Spring. The tension exists in a critical regional context, in which the United States 
has lost credibility after several failed wars and diplomatic initiatives in Syria, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. Rising US unpopularity existed for decades though it reached its apex after 
US silence during the democratic uprisings of the Arab Spring.  
Clearly, there are no easy solutions to adequately address the difficulties with 
often times contradicting US defense and human rights policies in the Middle East. There 
                                                
327 Simpfendorfer, Ben. "Introduction." The New Silk Road: How a Rising Arab World Is Turning Away 
from the West and Rediscovering China. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 37. Print. 
 141 
are, however, four steps that the US can follow to begin to redirect its policies, regain 
friendships, and position itself strategically for the future.  
First, the United States must not frame the Middle East in a strictly zero sum 
game. A rising China does not necessarily negate US power in the short or long term. 
Rather, the growth of China opens us the possibility for US influence to decrease in 
comparison to current levels, though not eliminate it or weaken it to a point of concern. 
As powerful actors like China establish a presence in the region, framing competition in a 
zero sum framework will only exacerbate tensions and serve Chinese interests. In fact, 
Chinese presence in the Gulf could result in US responsibilities becoming less 
demanding, as China builds its military capabilities and becomes incentivized to patrol 
the commons. China’s rise in the Gulf could be a positive development, freeing the US to 
reallocate some of its financial or military resources to other critical areas or to focus on 
other aspects of defense policies, like increasing defense or counterterrorism cooperation.  
A rising China is only problematic if US military and strategic influence declines 
to the point when US military strength is in jeopardy or surpassed by the Chinese. The 
United States military currently relies on the Gulf regimes for both access and 
cooperation, particularly in intelligence sharing, counterterrorism operations, and military 
privilege in the Gulf. The worst-case scenario would result in the US losing basing 
privileges and military access to the Gulf, leaving the US limited access to the region and 
fewer regional partners. Such a worst-case scenario is unlikely.   
The US should approach China’s increasing ties in the Gulf with openness, ready 
to engage with China and utilize its rising position to maintain stability where the US 
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cannot. In the next several decades, US interests will likely shift, as will Saudi, Bahraini 
and Chinese interests. The US is but a single supplier to the Saudis and Bahrainis. As 
future interests develop and change, similarly, security interests for the US, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, and China will evolve as well. Future changing variables are impossible to 
predict but the US can prepare itself for likely changes to minimize potential 
consequences or unforeseen challenges. For instance, the US should be prepared to retain 
less strategic influence in the Arabian Gulf. As China rises, the US should take advantage 
of China’s ability to provide stability in the Gulf and reposition its geostrategic interests 
to assure that the US can safeguard its most critical assets and interests.  
Second, the United States needs to reemphasize its common interests with the 
governments of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Despite differences in their approaches to 
human rights and governance, the governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
States have numerous mutual interests, including “containing the Iranian nuclear threat, 
challenging extremism and fighting terrorism, stabilizing the region, ending the violence 
in Syria, advancing an Arab-Israeli peace, and protecting energy supplies and 
international shipping.”328 These strategic interests bind the nations together and allow 
the three states to pursue their national policies.  
Counterintelligence and military cooperation are the pillars of these relationships 
and need to be reemphasized. While the military establishments are generally immune 
from diplomatic scuffles, in recent years, diplomatic tensions seeped into military 
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partnerships vis-à-vis Foreign Military Sales, affecting cooperation and trust between the 
parties. Reemphasizing the importance of the strategic relationships is necessary and does 
not deemphasize the importance of human rights in the Gulf. The US must recognize that 
its interests in the Gulf (stability, free flow of trade routes, military and intelligence 
cooperation) are intertwined with Gulf security interests as well. Thus, the United States 
military and diplomatic corps should take steps to remind its GCC partners about their 
intertwined interests by creating an annual conference through which critical GCC 
partners and the United States can meet to address strategies, grievances, and plans for 
future cooperation. The US should attempt to integrate GCC opinions of regional needs 
into a long term US strategy in the region. To be clear, GCC strategy should not dictate 
or overwhelm US strategies. Rather, its incorporation would provide the US with a 
greater understanding of GCC long term needs and goals, facilitate a cooperative 
environment focused on long-term cooperation, and provide a venue for addressing 
diplomatic concerns in a private atmosphere.  
Third, the Chinese are accomplishing something the United States has been 
attempting to do since the Cold War: speak directly to the Arabic speaking populations. 
Chinese officials, diplomats, and businessmen are studying and speaking Arabic at a level 
where they are comfortable addressing the Arab public on Al-Jazeera. To date, very few 
American diplomats speak Arabic and even fewer are comfortable addressing audiences 
through Arabic mediums.  Most Arabic work at embassies is designated to the foreign 
nationals hired in country or is sent out for translation. Currently, US appeals to the 
Arabic speaking populations are not made in person or are presented in English. Taking 
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the significant step of speaking in Arabic in both public and diplomatic settings would go 
a long way in connecting the US with local populaces. The US must invest more in 
cultural exchanges and foreign language learning in the United States and abroad if it 
hopes to control shifting rhetoric in non-English speaking media.  As animosity for the 
US increases in the Middle East, it becomes even more critical to mount a successful 
public relations campaign for the US in the region.   
Finally, it is essential that the United States find an alternative approach to human 
rights violations in the Gulf. The current US human rights policy in Bahrain is 
counterproductive and consistently results in tense diplomatic relations. Instead of using 
shame and blame tactics or publicly advocating for particular individuals, the United 
States should make a concerted effort to limit its public criticism and encourage private 
dialogue.  The US should also refrain from using arms sales as a stick to force 
cooperation.  
The US should take advantage of the close personal relations that decades of 
diplomatic and strategic cooperation have created by using its leverage of mutual 
interests and defense cooperation to privately advocate for human rights cases. US 
officials should discuss important human rights cases in private meetings with trusted 
leaders by using leverage to encourage substantive change instead of shaming leaders 
into compliance. Instead of using sticks to force partial or halfhearted cooperation, US 
diplomats should pursue a soft application of human rights policies. By including human 
rights as one of many factors that makes up a bilateral relationship, the US can quietly 
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encourage leaders to institute particular policies or changes without forcing a government 
to publicly submit to US pressure.  
The US can make human rights an implicit feature of dealing with US diplomacy 
by should emphasizing that economic and defense policies must also support US 
diplomatic policies, mentioning that even the US has domestic audiences which it must 
please. Negotiating as partners privately is more likely to prove effective than publicly 
shaming governments into compliance. Shaming creates an incentive for governments, 
particularly those governments in the Middle East where US policies are unpopular to 
stand up to US pressure and refuse to cooperate. Engaging in private discussions and 
publicly praising important improvements in human rights policies will prove to be more 
advantageous for US national interests and more politically tenable to the Gulf regimes.  
Not only do US actions provoke animosity between the US and other 
governments but also they rarely result in meaningful systemic change. In Saudi Arabia, 
what little criticism the US does voice, the Saudis ignore. In Bahrain, some changes 
occurred though according to the most recent Country Report the Bahraini forces 
continue to commit human rights abuses. It is clear the US policy of publicly condemning 
governmental abuses is counterproductive. The US human rights policies create tension 
between governments though do little to promote real change.  
The largest criticism of US human rights policies abroad is the US tendency to 
advocate for politically convenient human rights cases and ignore the rest. This policy, 
while it may appear to be using limited US resources intelligently, is actually 
counterproductive in many instances. US policies foster animosity from local 
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populations, tired of what they see as US interference and contradictory policies. When 
the US publicly advocates for a particular case or group of individuals but not others, it 
breeds hostility among both the ruling elites who do not desire US interference and 
among locals who perceive US efforts as favoring particular groups.  
Broadly speaking, the US should be consistent in its policy in each country. 
Naturally, there are practical constraints to consistency: changes in administrations, major 
international events like September 11, or significant domestic changes in a nation such 
as the revolutions that took place during the Arab Spring. Critical events should prompt a 
careful reevaluation of US foreign policy in a particular nation. Excluding extreme 
mitigating factors though, each administration should strive to either make human rights 
a consistent factor included in its bilateral relationships. The notion of consistency may 
sound banal, but the importance of the United States regaining trust and credibility in the 
Middle East will be an essential step to securing US interests in the long run. This begins 
with consistency with our allies and partners.  
In sum, the GCC began its pivot to China long before the US announced its pivot 
to Asia in 2012. As China becomes the economic center of gravity, the United States 
must reexamine the strengths and weaknesses of its foreign policy. In particular, the US 
must reexamine its approach to the Gulf, a region critical to the United States’ interests. 
Since the Arab Spring, US human rights policies in the Gulf have created both  
diplomatic and military tensions. Chinese acknowledgement and exploitation of that 
tension has resulted in GCC populations viewing China as a viable alternative to US 
influence the Gulf in the long run. The US needs a reevaluation of its diplomatic 
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approach in the GCC in order to support human rights and safeguard long-term US 
interests in the Arabian Peninsula. If the US continues on its current path, it may risk 
losing its influence in a region critical to US national security.  
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Glossary 
BAPCO: The Bahrain Petroleum Company  
BDF: Bahrain Defense Forces  
BMENA: Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiatives  
CENTCOM: US Central Command  
CPIC: Chongqing Polycomp International Corp.  
CRS: Congressional Research Service  
DOD: Department of Defense 
DOS: Department of State  
DRL: Department of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor  
EDB: Economic Development Board (Bahrain) 
EDA: Excess Defense Articles  
EIA: Energy Information Agency  
FMF: Foreign Military Financing 
FMS: Foreign Military Sales  
FTA: Free Trade Agreement 
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council  
GDP: Gross Domestic Product  
ICC: International Criminal Court  
IMET: International Military Education Training  
LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas  
MARCENT: Marine Corps Force Central Command  
MEPI: Middle East Partnership Initiative  
MIDEASTFOR: Middle East Force  
MoU: Memorandum of Understanding  
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NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NAVCENT: United States Naval Forces Central Command 
NEA: National Energy Administration (China) 
OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries  
OPM-MOI: Office of the Program Manager- Ministry of Interior (Saudi Arabia) 
PACOM: US Pacific Command  
SAUDI ARAMCO: The Saudi Arabian Oil Compnay  
SINOPEC: China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation  
TOW: Tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireless-guided missile  
UAE: United Arab Emirates  
UN: United Nations 
UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Council   
USMTM: United States Military Training Mission  
USTR: United States Trade Representative  
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